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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT 
The Latin American Centre on Food and Agricultural Price Stabilization 
and Support Policies was convened by the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) and met at Santiago, Chile, from 23 February to 6 March 1959- This 
was one of several such meetings organized by FAO in various parts of 
the world as a forum for the exchange of information on price stabilization 
policies and methods, for studying the results obtained and the problems 
that arise, and for collecting study material for the use of the Panel 
of Experts which met in Rome early in April 1959- ECLA cooperated 
closely with FAO at that meeting and the Chief of the Joint ECLA/FAO 
Programme officiated as Secretary of the Centre-
The participating countries deemed it advisable that the Centre's 
report should be submitted to the Economic Commission for Latin America 
for consideration at its eighth session and the Director General of FAO, 
bearing this suggestion in mind, has agreed that the attached reference 
document should be distributed. 
The secretariat suggests that the Commission should study the 
Centre's report in connexion with the problems arising out of the need to 
increase domestic supplies of agricultural commodities in order to satisfy 
growing demand in the region. The report will undoubtedly be very useful 
because it deals not only with the solutions based on price regulation 
and stabilization but also with others based on measures designed to 
increase productivity and reduce costs. Such measures are particularly 
important in Latin America since they provide the farmer with the 
necessary incentive to produce and thus increase his net income, and 
because they also help to eliminate some of the most serious obstacles 
to agricultural development. 
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I* INTRODUCTION 
The Latin American Centre on Food and Agricultural Price Stabilization 
and Support- Policies met in Santiago, Chile, between 23 February and ó March 
1959* The Centre, which was jointly sponsored by the Government of Chile ' 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in 
collaboration with the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), was 
convened in accordance with a recommendation made by the Ninth Session of 
the FAO Conference in 1957 and approved by the Fifth Regional Conference 
for Latin America in November 1958- As in the case of the FA'O/ECAFE Centre 
on Policies to Support and Stabilize Agricultural Prices and Incomes in 
Asia and the Far East (March 21 - April 3, 1958), which was the first of 
these meetings convened by FAO, the purpbse of the Latin American Centre 
was to provide a forum for the interchange of'information and for the 
study of the results obtained and the problems faced in implementing the 
various methods and measures which are now being applied in the region. 
The present report will be part of the basic information to be used by the 
Panel of Experts that will meet in Rome at the beginning of April 1959* 
The countries represented at the Centre deemed it advisable that this 
report should also be presented by FAO for the consideration of the Eighth 
Session of the Economic Commission for Latin America to be held in Panama 
in May 1959-
The Centre was attended by forty six representatives of fourteen 
Latin American countries, and by members of both sponsoring organizations. 
Observers were present from the United States of America and from the 
following Chilean organizations: Instituto de Economía de la Universidad 
de Chile, Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, Sociedad Nacional de 
Agricultura, Instituto Nacional de Comercio, Departamento Técnico Inter-
americano de Cooperación Agrícola, Banco Central y Banco del Estado. 
Mr. Enrique Delgado (Chile) was elected Chairman of the Centre and 
Messrs. Elias Soley (Costa Rica) and Ricardo de Sola (Venezuela) were 
elected Vice Chairmen. 
/A complete ' 
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A complete list of participants is given in Annex A. Annex B 
contains a table of contents of the documents issued at the Centre and 
Annex C the Agenda as finally adopted. 
Opening the Centre on 23 February 1959, Mr. Mario Astorga Cartes, 
Director General of Agriculture and Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture 
of Chile, welcomed the Delegates-
Mr. Astorga pointed out that the economic and social motivation 
of price support and stabilization policies in agriculture was to 
increase the productivity in this sector of the economy in order 
that it may play its part in the process of economic development. 
The formulation of such policies was particularly difficult in 
countries in the process of development, where large scale transfer 
payments between different sectors of the economy wère not feasible, 
and where as à result of the striking unbalance in the distribution 
of per caput incomes a large portion of the population lived on 
subsistence levels. There was an overriding need on the one hand 
for providing food at low cost to the less favoured sectors of the 
population and, on the other, for encouraging agricultural production. 
This required that price and exchange controls were to be complemented 
by'measures 'of à technical, economic and politico-social nature 
which could not be easily reconciled. The application of any price 
policy reflected so strongly on the economy as a whole that such 
policies needed to be very carefully planned and implemented-
Their application is particularly difficult in countries subject to 
progressive inflation, such as e.g. Chile. In organizing this 
Centre FAO satisfied a need felt by the majority of the governments 
of Latin American countries. A free discussion of the problems 
faced and the methods'employed by tiié various countries, of their 
success or failure, would help in formulating more consistent price 
support policies that could contribute to general economic develop-
ment and, at the same time, to the improvement of rural living 
conditions• 
Mr. Hernán Santa Cruz, FAO Regional Representative' in latin America, 
read a message from Mr. B.R. Sen, Director General of the Organization. 
,/kr. Sen 
Mr* Sen briefly traced the origin and the successive changes in the 
objectives of price support and stabilization policies in Latin America 
as well as in other parts of the world. 
Mr. Sen then stated that the agricultural price policies of 
Latin American countries have had to reconcile a number of sometimes 
conflicting objectives. On the one hand they had to encourage a 
badly needed expansion of production to meet the needs of a rapidly 
growing population with rising standards of living. On the other 
hand, they had to contribute to controlling the inflationary pressures 
resulting both from this unusually fast growth of demand -and from 
periodic booms on world markets. These objectives had further to 
be combined with the need to maximise export earnings and to reduce 
the drain on foreign exchange arising from quickly growing import 
requirements for some agricultural products. 
Agricultural expansion is, of course, largely a technological 
problem: a problem of know-how. FAO in fact devotes a large part 
of its resources, especially of technical assistance, in seeking to 
raise agricultural productivity and output. But evidently technology 
is only part of the answer. Unless a farmer sees in it some advantage 
for himself and his family, he is unlikely to make the extra effort 
or to use the better methods to step up his output for the market. 
It is here that agricultural support and stabilization measures have 
a major part to play. And it is largely for this reason that FAO 
attaches so much importance to this Centre, held in association with 
ECLA, where for the first time the countries of the region are 
meeting together to discuss their common problems in this field. 
For, undoubtedly, agricultural support and stabilization measures 
in many ways present more difficult problems in economically under-
developed countries than in the wealthier industrialized countries. 
What, in these circumstances, should be the level of support prices? 
On what basis should this level be established? How can they be 
most efficiently enforced? These are real problems which arise 
even more acutely in this region than in more industrialized 
countries. They make it all the more useful for the countries of 
/the region 
the region to confer together on how such matters can be most 
effectively tackled and with least cost to the consumer and tax-
payer. They also make it necessary to approach the problem over 
a very broad front. 
Agricultural support and stabilization policies, like all other 
policies, must seek to strike a balance between different, and some-
times conflicting, interests; for example, those of agricultural 
producers; of consumers; of international trade; of overseas payments. 
On the whole it appears, in recent years, the main emphasis in Worth 
American and Western European countries has been on the need to give 
a larger and more secure income to the producer, at the expense 
sometimes of other interests. In Latin American countries, on the 
other hand, the main emphasis appears to have been on safeguarding 
the consumer against over-high prices and inflation, and on 
channelling part of the profits from agricultural exports into 
other sectors of the economy, at times, it may be said, to the 
disadvantage of the producer. Nevertheless, the operation of the 
consumer price policies has often led to. substantial improvements 
in the food consumption levels of needy groups. Similarly, the 
various export price policies for agricultural commodities have 
contributed to the progress of industrialization. 
Apart from these general characteristics which have guided the 
application of agricultural price policies in the region, special 
mention must be made of the export price policies. Designed, on the 
one hand, to maximise export earnings and fiscal revenues, they have, 
on the other, tended to minimise fluctuations in the incomes of 
producers of export commodities and to aid in stabilizing the 
domestic price and cost structures. It is in this field of export 
price, policies, of such vital importance for many of the less 
developed countries, that the inventiveness of Latin American price 
policy makers has been particularly fecund and has produced a number 
of specifically Latin American methods. Among these, the use of 
multiple and variable exchange rates, the naforo" system, and the 
operation of government export agencies are the most widely applied. 
All of them have some advantages and some disadvantages. However, 
/their relative 
their relative effectiveness and their relative advantages and 
disadvantages so far never appear to have been subject to comprehensive 
and comparative analysis, at least in relation to balanced agri-
cultural and over all economic development • 
The conclusions of this Centre will be studied with great 
interest and care at the World Meeting on Price Policies to be held 
in Rome in April next and will also be reported to all FAO Member 
Nations at the Tenth Session of the FAO Conference in November this 
year. Mr. Sen was confident that they would also be considered by 
many of the governments of the region, since they will prove of 




1. The objectives of food and agricultural policies in the Latin American 
region are broadly: 
(a) to encourage an expansion of production to meet the needs of a 
very rapidly growing population with rising standards of living; 
(b) to keep essential foodstuffs within the needs of the poorer 
consumers, and to raise their nutritional levels; 
(c) to maximise earnings from agricultural exports-
The Centre considered that appropriate agricultural price and 
support policies could contribute powerfully to these ends. 
Their effect in most countries would be even greater if they 
were coupled with parallel measures e.g. to improve methods of 
production and marketing, or to improve the agrarian structure 
and other institutional weaknesses. 
2. At the present time price policies for basic foodstuffs in most Latin 
American countries are aimed primarily at stabilizing their price 
levels, particularly against seasonal and year to year fluctuations 
due to variations in yields. They do not have as their primary aim, 
as in some more industrialized countries, raising the general level 
of farm incomes in relation to incomes in other sectors of the economy. 
The large and sustained transfer payments to agriculture which such a 
policy would imply would not be feasible in more than a few Latin 
American countries in view of the generally low level of incomes and 
the large percentage of the population engaged in agriculture. 
3- During World War II and the decade afterwards when primary emphasis 
was placed on the control of retail prices for the protection of 
consumers, there was a considerable flow of funds from agriculture 
to other sectors of the economy, which in many countries contributed 
largely to the development of urban industries. These policies, 
however, resulted in inadequate investments in agriculture and a 
failure of agricultural production to keep pace with the rapid 
growth of demand. As a result inflationary pressures were aggravated, 
while exports declined and imports increased, thus adding to diffi-
culties of external payments and limiting the funds available for 
/imports of 
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imports of capital goods for general economic development. 
4* In the view of the Centre the recent tendency in many countries to 
stabilize farm prices at a somewhat higher level than before was 
necessary in order to encourage increased investment in agriculture 
and to correct imbalances of supply and demand which had developed 
during the year when farm prices were held at a relatively low level-
As a rule these policies have not been long enough in operation for 
their results to be appraised. In a few countries, however, thsy 
have already led to a steady expansion of production and occasionally 
to the emergence of small surpluses in formerly importing countries-
While the danger does not yet arise, incentive price policies should 
not be pushed too far in the years ahead or there is a danger of 
mounting stockpiles and regular annual surpluses which can be 
exported only with the aid of subsidies. Nor should the elimination 
of agricultural imports be regarded as the only indication of a 
need for increased production: consideration should also be given to 
natural, advantages and to some degree of specialization, possibly 
within the framework of a Latin American common market. Incentive 
price policies should be associated with the measures discussed 
below in paragraphs 8 and 9-
5- It was considered that in determining the level to stabilize farm 
price's, formulae of the type used in some industrialized countries J 
were not generally suited to the needs of Latin American countries, 
and might impose too great rigidity on price relationships. Note 
was taken, however, of some recently.devised formulae, with a moving 
average base period, which appear to combine a degree of price 
flexibility with the greater security to farmers ¡resulting from the 
formula methods. In general, the Centre considered that ad hoc 
methods, taking into account e.g. production costs, movements in 
general price levels, and the changing level and pattern of consumer 
demand were to be preferred. The price levels established should, .be 
subject to gradual revision if experience showed that they led either 
to an excessive or an insufficient expansion of output. Care should 
be taken to keep the prices of different agricultural commodities in 
reasonable relationship. This may involve problems of coordination 
/where price 
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where price stabilization schemes are operated for single commodities 
or groups of commodities by producers or other autonomous organizations-
6- In most Latin American countries prices of basic foods are stabilized 
by government intervention in the market, coupled with a system of 
buffer stocks and the regulation of the volume of imports or exports» 
This method seems well suited to the needs of the region and if 
effectively operated can be financially self-supporting; though it 
may also involve danger of losses. It has led to greatly increased 
attention to the marketing and grading of agricultural produce. 
Its further development and extension to a wider range of commodities 
would be of great value in many countries, particularly in those 
where farmers are small, unorganized and lacking, in financial resources. 
7- The Centre considered that the following conditions were necessary for 
the fully effective operation of such price stabilization measures: 
(i) announcement of minimum assured price level in advance of 
planting time; 
(ii) adequate availability of credit to farmers for the purchase 
of production requisites; 
(iii) a network of government purchasing agencies available to all 
producers as an alternative to accepting very low prices at 
harvest time from commercial traders; • 
(iv) adequate commercial and government storage capacity; 
(v) sufficient operating funds to finance thè purchase and storage 
of as much of the product as is necessary to maintain the 
announced minimum price levels; 
(vi) sufficient trained staff for the efficient operation of the 
programme. 
In order to provide adequate incentives to increase production without 
an unduly high level-òf prices, the C-entre considered that price 
support and stabilization measures should be supplemented by measures 
to increase agricultural productivity and to reduce costs- Consider-
able attention is given to provision of farm credit in Latin American 
countries, though hardly anywhere are funds fully commensurate with 
needs. Other support measures could usefully be more fully developed, 
such as the supply of improved planting material, fertilizers, farm 
/machinery and 
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machinery and other production requisites at reduced prices, e.g. 
by means of subsidies, by exemption of import duties, by increased 
allocations of foreign exchange, or by favourable exchange rates-
Such measures could lead to a considerably increased output at low 
cost, but could not entirely replace measures of price stabilization, 
or farm prices might fall with improvements in productivity so that 
the farmer received no net gain. These measures to raise productivity, 
together with the marketing improvements mentioned below in paragraph 
9 offer one means of combating the inflationary pressures which have 
become endemic in some countries of the region. 
9- Improvement in the marketing structure could also contribute to the 
problem of reconciling profitable prices to producers with retail 
prices within the reach of the poorer consumer. Better marketing 
facilities could also contribute to larger production by opening up 
new agricultural areas, and by improving the supply and quality of 
perishable foodstuffs. 
10. Ceiling prices at the retail level for the protection of the consumer 
are less widely used than during the first post war decade, but still 
have a place in Latin American price policies in view of the generally 
low level of consumer incomes- The imposition of ceiling prices, 
even though backed by sanctions, without a release of additional 
supplies from stocks or imports is. seldom effective. Even so they are 
difficult, to maintain over a wide area because of the inadequacy of 
communications in most Latin American countries. 
11. Ceiling consumer prices are likely to depress prices and incomes for 
farmers unless coupled with effective farm price, supports. Consumers* 
subsidies to reduce the gap between farm and consumer prices should 
be used with caution. Once granted they are not .easily removed. 
They sometimes lead to wasteful consumption, and are liable to be 
expensive in that they benefit those who do not need assistance as 
well as those who do. In general it is important not to raise the 
purchasing power of consumers for foodstuffs without a commensurate 
increase in supplies.• -
12. The agricultural export price policies of Latin American countries 
have been designed on the one hand to maximise export earnings, and 
/on the 
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on the other to minimise fluctuations in the income of producers 
of export products and to aid in stabilizing the domestic price and 
cost structure- Apart from direct regulation of the volume of 
exports the three measures most commonly applied are the channelling 
of exports through government or other official export agencies, 
multiple and variable exchange rate, and the "aforo" system. All 
three have been used primarily as variable export taxes, although 
both official export agencies and multiple and variable exchange 
rates can be and occasionally are used to subsidize exports- The 
three methods are not mutually exclusive, and are sometimes used in 
combination. 
13- The most complete control of exports and of insulation of domestic 
from international prices is possible when exports are channelled 
through a single export agency. Such agencies, however, are naturally 
very subject to political pressures and in some cases they have been 
used to keep export prices at a level which restricted sales, or to 
divert export proceeds to general government finances or other 
purposes to a degree that discouraged production. These practices 
are not of course inherent in the system, and there are instances 
of such agencies operating successfully. 
14- Multiple and variable exchange rates do not entirely insulate domestic 
from world prices unless the rates are changed in accordance with 
major fluctuations of world market prices. It is, however, difficult 
to operate the system so flexibly in practice- Its scope is of 
course much wider than the regulation of agricultural exports, and it 
can be used to influence the volume and direction of both exports and 
imports. Multiple and variable exchange rates are now used less 
widely than formerly, partly because they tend to encourage specu-
lation, to reduce the business confidence of both importers and 
exporters, and to aggravate inflationary pressures. Argentina, for 
example, has adopted a free exchange rate system, under which world 
market prices are reflected in producer returns with a view to obtain 
adjustment of supplies to demand; producers are protected by minimum 




IS- The aforo system is no more than a highly flexible and simply 
administered method of variable export taxation. It appears to have 
been very successful in avoiding the inflationary effects of price 
booms in export markets, but it can do nothing to prevent price 
fluctuations arising from variations in domestic supply and demand. 
Nor can it aid producers if world market prices fall to unprofitable 
levels. It is therefore sometimes supplemented by other measures to 
aid producers. 
16. Since agriculture employs about 50 per cent of the workers of the 
region and contributed 22 to 24 per cent of the gross national income, 
the functioning of the whole economy depends to a large extent on the 
progressive development of agriculture in all its aspects. At the 
present time progressive development is being delayed by many 
institutional factors as well as by an inadequate development of 
both direct and indirect price support and stabilization policies-
17- In the view of the Centre a fully effective agricultural development 
policy would have to attack not only the problem of agricultural price 
and support policies, but also a number of other difficulties which 
tend to impede agricultural expansion which we discuss briefly in 
Chapter VII. The present report is concerned explicitly with the 
economic incentives for an expansion of production, and it has been 
shown that in the past these were generally insufficient to foster 
a level of investment and consequently a rate of increase in the 
agricultural productivity and production necessary for the balanced 
economic development of the region. These policies are now being 
modified and a considerable improvement may be expected to ensue. 
Nevertheless higher prices and other incentives to increased 
agricultural production cannot be expected to exert their full 
potential effect unless parallel improvements are made to remove 
other obstacles to agricultural expansion. 
/ill. REVIEW 
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III. REVIEW OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL PRICE POLICIES AND OTHER 
AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 
A. General 
The Centre undertook a review of the food and agricultural support 
policies of the countries represented. In this review they were aided 
by detailed statements from each delegation on the main objectives and 
methods u;;ed in their own countries, and of their experiences in implementing 
then; as well as by a secretariat study of such policies in selected Latin 
American countries. The situation in each country as it emerged from these 
discussions is briefly summarized later in this chapter. 
• The Latin American region as a whole is characterized by an exception-
ally rapid expansion in the demand for foodstuffs and other agricultural 
products. This stems partly from the very fast growth of population, and 
partly from rising per caput incomes, which at the generally low income 
levels of most countries of the region have relatively a greater effect on 
the demand for food than in more industrialized and wealthier countries. 
The rapid expansion of demand has greatly coloured the economic and social 
conditions of the region. It has for example led to rather widespread 
inflationary pressures* It has resulted in increased imports of foodstuffs 
and also in decreased exports, a matter of great importance since many 
countries of the region depend primarily on agricultural exports for their 
earnings of foreign exchange. All these factors are reflected in the 
agricultural price and support policies of Latin American countries. 
In many countries of Latin America most agricultural producers operate 
on a small scale, lack financial resources, and are very little organized 
in producers associations or cooperatives. To obtain ready cash, and often 
because they are already in debt for production and living expenses, the 
majority are forced to sell their produce immediately after the harvest 
when markets are glutted. As a result there are immense seasonal swings 
in agricultural prices to the grave disadvantage of both producers and 
consumers- It was reported, for example, that in Colombia the maximum 
price of potatoes in a year was commonly three times the post-harvest price. 
These within year fluctuations are superimposed upon price variations due 
to differences in yields from year to year, which can be considerable, 
/especially in 
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especially in countries subject to extreme weather conditions-
Another source of price instability, which affects both large and 
small producers, is the heavy dependence of many countries on agricultural 
export markets, where prices fluctuate widely, both with changes in supplies 
and with changes in the level of economic activity and demand in the main 
importing countries. Such price fluctuations affect not only the particular 
export product concerned, but in some Latin American countries, by influencing 
the general level of prosperity, may have a considerable effect on price 
levels as a whole for all products -
In these circumstances a primary objective of food and agricultural 
pric§ policies in nearly all countries is price stabilization. In this 
chapter only price stabilization on domestic markets will be considered, 
apart from passing references to export products in country reviews. The 
main discussion of price stabilization measures for export commodities is 
reserved for a later chapter- But it may be noted here that export 
policies have been aimed not only at reducing fluctuations in returns for 
the individual commodity, but also in some countries at general price 
stabilization. 
During World War II and the decade afterwards it appears-that. the 
main emphasis of price stabilization measures in most countries of the 
region was on regulating prices to consumers and on keeping down the retail 
cost of basic foodstuffs in the face of inflationary pressures. Price 
ceilings were imposed at the retail, and sometimes at the wholesale and 
farm levels as well- They were enforced by regulating the level of imports 
or exports, by government intervention in markets, and not infrequently by 
resort to consumer subsidies. The wide range of measures used to regulate 
foreign trade, including export and import quotas, multiple and variable 
exchange rates and the aforo systems, are discussed briefly in relation 
to producers and consumers in Chapters IV and V respectively, and more 
fully in Chapter VI on agricultural export. policies. 
In the last few years, however, there appears to have been a marked 
shift in emphasis in a number of countries- It was found that price 
stabilization policies aimed primarily at keeping down the cost of food to 
the consumer often did not give enough incentive to producers to obtain 
/the rapid 
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the rapid expansion of food production necessitated by the circumstances 
in the region- The .results, as already noted, were continuing inflationary 
pressures, together with declining food exports, mounting food imports, 
and increased difficulties of foreign payments. . 
Argentina and Chile may be cited as two recent examples of countries 
which have reoriented their price stabilization policies to provide greater 
incentives for agricultural expansion. In most countries of the region 
producer prices of basic foods now tend to be somewhat above the general 
level of prices at which food could be imported. As a rule the change has 
been too recent for the outcome of the new policies to be assessed. In a 
few countries, however, e.g. Costa Rica and Panama a state of self-
sufficiency for basic foodstuffs has been reached, and small exportable 
surpluses arise when harvests are good. In the years ahead, care may be 
necessary in some countries to avoid the emergence of regular surpluses 
which could be exported only with the aid of subsidies or special exchange 
rates, and to prevent an uneconomic use of resources. 
The method primarily used for price stabilization has been government 
intervention in the market, coupled with a system of buffer stocks and 
measures to regulate the volume of foreign trade- Very often special 
organizations have been set up to regulate the marketing of a group of 
basic foodstuffs. There are also many examples of producer or other 
autonomous organizations to regulate the marketing of individual 
agricultural commodities, especially those destined for export. Although 
all of these agencies cooperate closely with agricultural, economic 
development and other government departments, concerned, the existence of 
these separate agencies may in some cases raise problems in coordinating 
price levels between different agricultural commodities in order to obtain 
a balanced development of agriculture in relation to the growth of demand. 
An additional point which may be mentioned here is that in some countries, 
e«g. Cuba, the impossibility of securing a sufficiently rapid development 
of export outlets has led to increased attempts to expand and diversify 
production for the domestic market, often with the help of price incentives 
and similar policy ..measures. 
The widespread adoption of a network of official buying agencies and a 
system of buffer stocks, as the principal measure of price stabilization, 
/appears to 
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appears to be well suited to the conditions of the region- Government funds 
are seldom available on a large scale for agricultural support measures, 
except to the extent that profitable export markets may make possible 
subsidies or incentive prices to expand the output of one or two 
commodities for domestic consumption- Moreover, the generally low level 
of incomes, and the large size of the agricultural sector in most Latin 
American economies rule out large transfer payments to agriculture of the 
kind common in some highly industrialized countries-
On the other hand, the wide within-season price fluctuations under 
free market conditions in most Latin American countries make it possible 
for price stabilization measures based essentially on buffer stocks to be 
self-supporting if efficiently run- At the same time, unless sufficient 
trained staff, financial resources and suitable storage capacity are 
available, heavy trading losses and physical wastage may ensue- Several 
countries reported heavy losses of this kind during the early years of 
operating stabilization schemes- Additional funds for price stabilization 
measures may sometimes come from profits on imports, when these are 
handled by the stabilising agency, or from other sources-
The stabilization of prices by official intervention in markets has 
led to greatly increased attention to grading and presentation of 
agricultural products, and this should greatly benefit Latin American 
agriculture. In most countries these improvements have so far occurred 
mainly in basic foodstuffs (e.g. cereals, beans) and in .export products-
As the coverage of price stabilization measures is gradually extended, 
however, similar improvements may be looked for in other products as well-
The limited availability of public funds has so far restricted the 
use made of measures aimed at increasing the efficiency and reducing the 
costs of agricultural production- The main efforts appear to have been 
directed towards the provision of agricultural credit, and in some countries 
very valuable services to farmers are being built up,-though hardly any-
where are funds adequate to needs- Some countries are now giving greater 
attention to other measures of increasing production efficiency; the matter 
is discussed more fully in Chapter III- It appears that this is one 
direction in which further developments may be particularly useful, both 
in increasing the competitiveness of Latin American agriculture, and in 
/making possible 
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making possible the needed rapid expansion of production without unduly 
high price levels -
B- Review of the situation by countries 
1. ARGENTINA 
The recent initiation of an economic and financial stabilization scheme 
has brought about deep changes in the Argentinian economic structure* This 
programme intends to create, among other things, .favourable conditions for 
increasing production and expanding trade on a free competitive basis that 
is expected to be followed ultimately by a reduction of general price levels 
as a consequence of lower costs and profit margins. Government intervention 
by fixing unrealistic prices Is being eliminated and direct as well as 
indirect subsidies are being removed. On the other hand, a single and 
free exchange rate has been introduced, based on the relationship between 
supply and demand. As a transitional measure intended to mitigate the 
impact of a sudden increase in farm incomes, a system of retention of a 
part of expert earnings has been introduced which diminishes the proceeds 
of exported produce. At the same time, and especially as regards 
agricultural commodities, former market regulations have been liberalized-
At present there is a free market for all grains and their derivatives 
with the exception of wheat. In this latter case the Government deemed it 
necessary to leave its marketing in the hands of the National Grain Board 
(Junta Nacional de Granos) a self-supporting Government body created on 
October 24, 1956, with the principal aim to defend producer interests. Its 
relations with the executive branch of Government are maintained through 
the Secretariat of Agriculture and its jurisdiction extends over the entire 
national territory. The principal terms of reference and functions of the 
Board are: 
- To prepare and submit for the approval of the Government's executive 
branch minimum price proposals; 
- To engage in the actual trade of those grains, oilseeds and sub-
products for which minimum prices have been fixed, in order to 
defend producer interests or. to regulate their markets; 
- To regulate grain transactions introducing standard procedures in 
accordance with: current usage and practices; modern technology; 
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the interests of producers, merchants, processors and consumers 
as well as foreign market requirements; 
- To make sure that farmers will receive the right price for their 
products in accordance with classes and grades as defined by 
official standards or contracts; 
- To assist in the preparation, negotiation and carrying out of 
international agreements contemplated by the Government and of 
grain contracts made by the State with foreign countries; 
- To determine the location of, and to operate, terminal and radial 
elevators, silos and other equipment for the assembly, storage and 
loading of grain that belongs to Government; to take charge of 
their maintenance and to build additional capacity or dispose of 
superfluous or uneconomical units in any manner, if necessary 
demolishing or selling them and/or making plans for new installations; 
- To supervise the weighing of grain when received or at any other 
stage of its sale, handling or transportation; 
- To determine the best procedure for storing grain and to prepare 
and enforce mandatory rules for the preservation, antiparasitic and 
other treatment of grain at any stage of its marketing or transport. 
In addition to the above, the Board has been designated to carry into 
effect the provisions of Laws 11,742 and 12,253 of October 1933 and 
September 1935* respectively. This implies, among others, the following 
activities: 
- Administration of the Government owned elevator network and 
determination of its rules of operation; 
- Leasing elevators in accordance with established rules, preferably 
to farm groups or cooperatives; 
- Supervising all organizations and bodies that engage directly or 
indirectly in the domestic or international commerce of grains; 
- Selection of types of grain to be grown in various zones of the 
national territory if and when required; 
- Delivery of certificates establishing class, grade and other 




The system now in force with respect to wheat price fixing is as 
follows: 
1. Government announces yearly a basic price for medium-hard W° 2 
wheat with 78 kgs. per hectoliter specific weight, delivered on 
board railway wagon in the port. (It amounted to 100 pesos per 
100 kg. for the 1957/58 crop year and 150 pesos for 1958/59 until 
January 15, 1959, when it was raised to 2C0 pesos.) This price is 
adjusted upward or downward for class or quality, according to 
standard specifications. The tests required for this purpose are 
made by Board specialists or by domestic private Chambers of Cereals 
on the basis of representative samples both parties are obliged to 
take. 
2. Producers may sell directly to the Board (this being the less common 
practice) or through the medium of cooperatives or commercial 
organizations. Both cooperatives and private firms must obtain 
authorization from the Board if they wish to trade with it in this 
manner. 
3- The Board thus enteis in possession of the bulk of the wheat crop. 
It supplies domestic mills with grain (about three million metric 
tons per year) and sells the balance to local private export firms 
on a f.o.b. Argentinian basis. Wheat destined to be used as seed 
or for livestock feeding may be freely negotiated. Export prices 
are determined at periodical auction sales organized by the Board. 
With the exception of wheat, all other grains as well as their 
derivatives and by-products may be negotiated in the free market. Govern-
ment guarantees floor prices for these, and will buy any amount offered on 
the basis of a standard price adjusted in accordance with quality and 
freight charges to the nearest port. 
Thus producers have a free choice between selling at minimum prices 
to the Board or at higher prices to private dealers resulting from the 
free interplay of offer and demand. 
After the recent introduction of the uniform single exchange rate 
system, the Board has ceased to intervene in the export trade of farm 
produce acquired by private dealers in the domestic market, except in 
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the case of wheat and wheat flour sold by the Board to private exporters * 
Beginning with this year customs authorities only determine export values 
for taxation purposes-
2. BOLIVIA 
Agricultural price policies in Bolivia have not followed an integrated 
plan based on studies and technical investigations, but have been determined 
ad hoc by the supply and demand situation, thus remaining traditionally 
arbitrary. 
Producer prices of foods and other agricultural commodities were 
depressed, up to 1956.0 through the competition of products imported at 
preferential exchange rates which, in many cases, reduced their prices to 
levels at which domestic producers could not compete-
After the international conflict of 1932-35* Bolivia started a series 
of monetary devaluations, which compelled the Government to adopt a policy 
of preferential exchange rates for Imports of essential consumer goods, in 
order to supply the population at prices within the limits of the small 
average per caput income- In Bolivia foreign exchange resources are 
mainly derived from mineral exports, and are largely used for the import-
ation of foodstuffs which the country cannot produce in sufficient quantity. 
This system of price .control worked as a disincentive for the 
expansion and improvement of domestic production in Bolivia, and thus 
affected agricultural development unfavourably0 No non-price support 
measures were used to reduce costs of production and raise efficiency in 
farming. The marketing of agricultural products is furthermore greatly 
hampered by the great distances separating the regions of production from 
the consumption centres, and by the inadequacy of transportation 
facilities. However, since 1952 farm-to-market roads have been constructed 
in the larger agricultural areas, particularly in the Oriente and Jungas 
de la Paz Provinces. 
On the consumer side, the system of. food imports under preferential 
exchange rates also had serious effects- For example, sugar, which was 
imported from Peru at especially low exchange rates under a quota system, 
was immediately re-exported to Peru at a huge profit to traders. In 1956, 
when the multiple exchange rate system was replaced by a single exchange 
rate, consumer prices of essential imported goods rose sharply. 
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The demand for foods has also increased greatly as a result of the 
agrarian reform which affected a large section of the population. Con-
sequently, food imports had to be increased. 
In 3.956 the Government initiated the stabilization programme 
establishing a new unified exchange rate and abandoning multiple rates-
Bolivia entered thus into a new phase in its agricultural and foreign 
trade policy giving more scope to the free play of demand and supply forces-
Prices of all agricultural and livestock products, whether produced 
at home or imported, are now completely free, except for wheat, where about 
90 per cent of domestic requirements are covered through aid by the United 
States Government. The domestic wheat price is fixed by the Ministry of 
Economy. 
The Government and the people of Bolivia are now devoted to the 
development of production with a view to increasing domestic supplies. 
To this effect a cooperative movement was also initiated recently. 
3- CHILE 
The agricultural price policy followed by Chile during the last 
decades has played an important role in determining agricultural incomes 
and can explain, at least in part, the slow development of the agricultural 
sector of the economy. Chile's experience in this sense is valuable since 
the long-term effect of the policy of fixing maximum prices to contain 
inflation has been" to aggravate the problem of scarcity of foods and to 
accentuate even more-the imbalance between supply and demand. This in 
turn has served to- stimulate the inflationary process which was supposed 
to be contained through maxim.tim price controls. 
Up to 1930 prices were determined freely in the market." There were 
also no foreign trade and no exchange rate controls- National prices were 
directly related to international market prices. 
Subsequently, and with the objective of stimulating production which 
had fallen considerably as a result of the 1929-30 price depression, a 
policy of' minimum support prices for agriculture was established. This was 
initiated in 1933 with wheat* 
In 1939^ economic conditions changed notably and the Government price 
policy likewise- Price control at the retail level was emphasized and 
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measures to restrict foreign trade were also tightened through the action 
of the Food Supply Office (Comisariato de Subsistencias) and the Agricultural 
Export Board (Junta de Exportación Agrícola) respectively- The object was 
to regulate the market in order to support the price level desired by the 
Government which was generally fixed for the short-run protection of the 
consumer without considering the medium and long-term effects on agri-
cultural production. 
Starting in 1940, inflationary pressures became stronger and at the 
same time the Government intensified its efforts to directly control prices 
of the most important food and agricultural products by measures such as 
ceilings at the wholesale and retail level, import and export controls, 
and exchange rato controls, including multiple and variable exchange 
rates. As a result of these measures most agricultural products were 
insulated from international market prices. 
Various public bodies have acted to put these measures into practice. 
The principal ones were: the Food Supply Office (Comisariato de Subsisten-
cias), the Agricultural Export Board (Junta de Exportación Agrícola), the 
Agricultural Economics Institute (Instituto de Economía Agrícolathe 
Foreign Trade Council (Consejo de Comercio Exterior), the Production 
Development Corporation (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción), the 
National Trade Institute (Instituto Nacional de Comercio), the Supply and 
Price Inspection Service (Superintendencia de Abastecimiento y Precios), 
the Foreign Exchange Commission (Comisión de Cambios Internacionales), the 
Agricultural Credit Agency (Caja de Crédito Agrario), the State Bank 
(Banco del Estado), and the Central Bank (Banco Central). The Ministries 
of Economy and Agriculture also took part in the controls. 
Since 1955 mostly as a result of the intervention of the Ministry of 
Agriculture a tendency towards a gradual relaxation of controls on 
agricultural products started. Thus, the maximum prices at the wholesale 
level for meat, milk and rice were successively eliminated, and certain 
restrictions on foreign trade as well as measures impeding the better 
marketing of certain products were also relaxed. At the same time, 
minimum prices were established for wheat and sunflower seed, substituting 
maximum price controls for these products. 
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Recently, prices for all agricultural and food products with the 
exception of wheat were freed- For wheat an annual minimum price was 
established which was supported by direct purchases by the Government 
through the National Trade Institute (Instituto Nacional de Comercio). 
Tax exemption, the elimination of certain administrative difficulties 
and recently, devaluation of the currency, acted as an incentive for 
agri colt ur al export s. 
In summary, it can be noted that after a long period of maximum price 
controls at the x^ holesale and retail level, and of control of foreign trade 
and of marketing of agricultural and livestock products (1939-1953) 
unsatisfactory results have been obtained. Production has failed to 
increase at the required rate and marketing costs and margins have increased 
excessively in the absence of a freely competitive system-
4. COLOMBIA. 
In Colombia, the Instituto Nacional de Abastecimientos (I.N.A.) has, 
since 3.944* acted in the field of price policy and market stabilisation 
for basic foodstuffs. Main attention has been centred in the last six 
years on five principal products: rice, beans, wheat, maize and potatoes. 
In the course of the last year two additional products, sesame and peas 
were also handled by I.N.A.-. • i • 
In addition, a number of semi-public institutions exist which are 
concerned specifically with important products outside I-N-A-'s jurisdiction-
The most important of these is the Federación Nacional-de Cafeteros^ 
established in 1928, which since the early 1940s,, has intervened actively 
in the domestic and world coffee market. Coffee constitutes some 80 per 
cent of the total export value of the country. The Coffee Federation 
disposes at present of large and well-organized warehouses where coffee 
as well as other products can be stored^ and has buying agencies reaching 
even the most remote production zones- • 
Traditionally, the Coffee Federation buys at domestic mindjnum prices 
for coffee, effectively implemented on a national scale- These prices are 
set in accordance with current world market conditions and take into 
account the need to provide reasonable returns to producers- T^he Federation 
only buys in volume when its minimum price equals or exceeds the free 
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price of exportable coffee, which itself is determined by the world price, 
and by a rather complex set of regulations affecting coffee'exports-
The other principal commodity institutions are: Instituto de Fomento 
Algodonero (Cotton); Instituto Tabacalero (Tobacco); Campaña del Cacao-
These institutes intervene in various ways in the domestic market of the 
specific products, but aleo perform many additional functions to generally 
assist ar*d stimulate production. 
Objectives of I.N.A. The main objectives of I.N.A. can be stated as 
follows: a) to reduce or eliminate large seasonal fluctuations character-
istic of Colombia's domestic food markets; b) to create conditions 
propitious for the expansion of food production, needed to supply the 
requirements of a rapidly growing and developing population; and c) to 
improve the standards of living of the rural population. 
Methods of implementation. The I.N.A. aims at attaining these 
objectives by intervening directly in the market for the products mentioned, 
purchasing at pre-established minimum prices in times of harvest, and 
selling whenever demand requires additional supplies. I.N.A. has also 
imported supplies in times of shortages and may (but has not so far) 
arrange exports of any products in excess supply. For these purposes 
I.N.A. 'disposes of a network of buying and selling agencies, and is at 
present engaged in the construction of a number of grain elevators and 
warehouses, some of which are functioning already. Through the press 
I-N.A.'s minimum prices payable to producers, and maximum prices to be 
charged at retail to consumers are published. This, together with the 
actual buying and selling operations themselves* are thought to have had 
a stabilizing effect on the domestic food market, and production appears 
to be on the upswing. 
Principal difficulties* In the past, many problems have arisen in the 
operation of I.N.A.'s functions. These were mainly technical and 
administrative difficulties in the first period (1944-1952) of the 
institution's history.' As a result, considerable losses were suffered in 
the products stored, and thé prestige of I.N.A. declined. Direct market 
intervention involves considerable financial risks, and there is an 
imperative need to prepare the ground ful]y before adopting this method 
of price stabilization. 
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Special features* 1) The prices are not determined by cost of 
production-plus formulae, because of the difficulties of obtaining 
representative cost data and conceptual problems- Rather, the prices are 
fixed by historical comparison keeping in mind the effects of I.N.A.'s 
prices on supply and demand; 2) since seasonal price fluctuations are very 
large on the Colombian food market (maximum potato prices in one crop year 
may be as much as three times as high as the minimum ones), there is a 
good possibility of financing market intervention by buying at harvest 
time and selling during the non-harvest period, with little or no need to 
obtain outside funds once the system is operating; 3) serious attention 
is now being givén to problems of quality differentiation and to the 
determination of grades and standards in general. 
Conclusions.' With the exception of coffee, Colombian agricultural 
price policies are still in a rather early stage- Many serious difficulties 
have been overcome, and there is a notable tendency towards better 
organization and more technical studies- The country has a long way to go 
before the stabilization objectives are attained on a national scale-
5- COSTA RICA 
Costa Rica is one of the countries in Latin America with most 
experience in price regulation and market stabilization policies- Since 
1937 the Government has directly intervened in the country's principal 
markets for foodgrains, both at the producer and the consumer level. 
Initially, the products concerned were rice, beans and maize, and to these 
more products were added with time-
At first the responsibilities in this connexion were carried by the 
Ministry of Finance and by the National Bank of Costa Rica (State. Bank), 
but more recently the National Production Council (Consejo Nacional de la 
Producción) was established first as a dependency of the Bank. In 1948 
the Council became a semi-autonomous institution, gaining full autonomy 
in 1956-
The Consejo buys, in competition with private trade, quantities of 
foodgrains and other foodstuffs, paying prices 'determined in advance for 
the sowing season. The acquired products are stored in public warehouses 
until consumer prices reach a certain level, after which they are released 
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to the public through wholesale and retail channels as well as by direct 
sales to consumers. The Consejo offers its products for sale during 
harvest time as well as throughout the year. Both producer and consumer 
price regulations are handled by one and the same institution. 
The objectives of this intervention in the market are both to 
protect producers against sharp price falls which were frequently brought 
about artificially during harvest time by the private trade, and to prevent 
unreasonable rises in consumer prices. These price fluctuations are mainly 
seasonal in character. In years of short crops imports are made to prevent 
domestic price rises. 
At present the Consejo disposes of two central grain elevators with 
a capacity of about 40,000 metric tons of foodgrain, and of 51 regional 
buying and selling agencies. The latter are equipped with facilities to 
determine quality and humidity of the various products and some have drying 
equipment. 
The Consejo intervenes in the regulation of â large number of 
commodities, including fish products, but the bulk of the operations are 
in rice, beans and maize. 
The basis for the determination of the Consejo1s purchase prices is 
average cost of production, determined by special surveys. These costs, 
as used by the Consejo, take account of cash operating costs, as well as 
of depreciation charges and a reasonable rate of interest on the invested 
capital. However, this production cost formula is applied in a flexible 
way so as to take into consideration any special problems of demand or 
supply, the crop situation and stocks-
The Central Bank finances 80 per cent of the value of the products 
acquired by the Consejo at 4 per cent interest. The remaining funds are 
either supplied by the Consejo itself or may be financed through credit 
from the commercial banking system at 6 per cent interest. 
The official standard-prices are fixed for first quality products 
having a certain degree of humidity and deductions are made by the purchasing 
agencies, on account of excess humidity or impurity of thé product concerned 
in order to adjust them to established standards. The problem of grading 
has been a very important one, and much attention is paid to the establish-
ment of a uniform system. 
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Difficulties* Costa Rica has not been spared the difficult problems 
caused by the operation of a direct market intervention scheme. Insect 
infestation has damaged stocks in early years of operations, owing to the 
lack of adequate storage space- Food shortages have made the effective 
regulation of consumer prices particularly difficult. In the past, lack 
of finances has often limited the size of the Consejors operations. In the 
first phases of the programme it was necessary to train technical ¡sersonnel. 
Conclusions. As a result of a long and steady effort, Costa Rica has 
been able to book a considerable degree of success in its objectives of 
agricultural price stabilization. The effects of the Government programme 
of direct market intervention for a wide range of products are felt 
throughout the country. The products covered include both these consumed 
directly by the public and those used as raw materials in industry. The 
result is a satisfactory balance between domestic production and consumption 
and stabilised consumer .prices and producer incomes.- This was obtained 
through a comprehensive policy, which included price guarantees, adequate 
financing and assistance in solving the technological and marketing problems 
involved. 
6. CUBA 
Price controls in Cuba have been implemented by different organizations 
each of which deals with a specific agricultural product. 
The intervention of the Government, as to tobacco, dates from August 
1946- At present tobacco production is controlled by the "Comité de la 
Producción Agrícola Tabacalera" whose main function is to advise the 
Minister of Agriculture on the establishment of national production quotas 
and on the determination of floor prices for each crop year. In order to 
develop production and to guarantee the established price the committee 
makes its own purchases, or advances to raw tobacco producers the necessary 
funds for the selection process, against the guarantee of their crops. 
Among other functions of the committee, the purchase of land to be 
subsequently distributed to small producers, should be noted. In regard 
to the purchase of tobacco the committee generally restricts its activities 
to the portions unsold after private buyers complete their purchases. 
The operation of the committee considerably contributed to develop 
tobacco production in Cuba- Activities up to the 1956-57 crop concerned a 
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total of over 1.6 million hundredweight evaluated at about $ 70 million. 
In view of the fact that sales have been made at an average loss of 40 per 
cent the total deficit of all operations was of about $ 30 million. The 
Banco de Fomento Agrícola e Industrial de Cuba (BANFAIC) assisted the 
"Comité de la Producción Agrícola Tabacalera" in the financing of producers 
in accordance with established quotas. 
As to rice, since January 1955* a tax has been established of 10 cents 
for 100 pounds of husked rice on national production as well as on imports. 
It is prohibited to pass this tax on to the consumer; thus in the case of 
the domestic rice the millers deduct the tax from their payment to producers. 
Since November 1955 the "Administración de la Estabilización del Arroz" 
has been assisting the Minister of Agriculture in the establishment of 
production and import quotas for rice. It determines furthermore minimum 
prices for rice and may purchase the product at the established price, 
particularly from small farmers. It may also sell in the market for the 
purpose of stabilising consumer prices. However, up to the present the 
Administration has made no purchases of rice because market conditions have 
remained favourable to producers. 
A branch of the Administration called the "Comisión Económica del 
Arroz" was created in January 1957- The purpose of this commission is to 
estimate crops and to generally analyze the economic problems of rice. 
Intervention in the coffee economy is the responsibility of the 
"Instituto Cubano de Estabilización del Café (ICEA)" established in 1934 
in the wake of the world economic crisis. During the last few years the 
Institute also concerned itself with problems of production, trade and 
processing of coffee for domestic consumption as well as with export trade. 
Furthermore, the Institute usually represents the Cuban coffee interests in 
the different international conferences. The Institute has been also 
responsible for legislation to avoid the adulteration of coffee, making the 
Cuban product rate among the best in the world. 
The Institute also contributed to the establishment of the "Administración 
de Compra y Venta de Café" which guarantees a minimum price to producers by 
buying the coffee at these minimum prices established each year. The 
activities of the Institute, particularly its efforts to stabilize the coffee 
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market, met with considerable success: salaries in the coffee industry are 
particularly high and at the same time a way has been found to solve the 
problem of unemployment for many thousands of agricultural workers during 
the slack season. The Institute completely covered domestic coffee needs 
which on a per caput basis are surpassed only by Iceland and Sweden, and 
contributed to the establishment of a regular export trade of coffee which 
at the end of 1956 represented about 465 thousand hundredweight valued 
at approximately & 23 million. 
To assist the.development of agricultural and livestock production, 
processing and marketing, an enterprise under the name of "Empresa Trans-
formadora de Productos Agropecuarios S.A." was formed in June 1956. The 
capital of $ 5 million was subscribed by BANFAIC, the "Sanco Cubano de 
Comercio Exterior", the "Banco de Desarrollo y Económico Social" and by 
the associations, cooperatives, private producers and other entities and 
persons which are involved in the trade and processing of agricultural 
produce. 
This firm has already traded beans, maize, onions, rice, potatoes and 
burley tobacco. 
7- ECUADOR 
In Ecuador the price policy is not the result of a comprehensive plan, 
but measures that have been taken from time to time have been mainly of an 
ad hoc nature, whenever difficulties in food production required official 
price regulation. 
The Ecuadorian farmer has a very low per caput productivity and this 
fact must be taken into account for the purposes of the establishment of 
any price policy with respect to agricultural products-
In principle, the supply of agricultural products in Ecuador is 
controlled by a Supply Office (Dirección de Subsistencias) which intervenes 
in buying and selling products for immediate consumption, but the Office's 
operations are small in relation to the size of the internal market, and . 
as a result have little effect. 
When conditions have required it, temporary price support policies have 
been in operation during certain periods. It may be said that the Ecuadorian 
Government pursues a policy of caution in respect to prices in order to 
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maintain the stability of the Sucre, which has been maintained for a long 
period, while the general price level has increased little* Price inter-
vention in Ecuador has been limited to rice, wheat, cocoa, coffee, bananas 
and cotton. 
Domestic consumption of rice in Ecuador absorbs about 45. to 50 Pe** 
cent of production. In view of the impossibility of exporting the surpluses 
at a price which covers at least the cost of production, the Government has 
been obliged to follow a policy of export subsidies. Initially, exporters 
converted the value of rice exports at two different exchange rates. 
About four fifths of the amount was converted at the official rate, and the 
rest at a free rate prevailing for imports of luxury goods. At present, 
the Ministry.of Development (Ministerio de Fomento) fixes farm prices for 
rice according to quality, with the object of providing an incentive for the 
production of the better qualities. 
Ecuador supplements its wheat production with imports from the United 
States and Canada. The imported grain enters the country at a lower price 
than that of the national product, and this has resulted in a certain 
illegal transport of imported wheat towards the Colombian border. Owing 
to the price difference between national and imported wheat, the Government 
has had to fix every year the wheat price paid by the mills to farmers and 
has also fixed a quota of national wheat that every mill must acquire, in 
proportion to its capacity. 
The internal markets for cocoa and coffee are completely free for 
producers, as well as for middlemen and exporters. The Cocoa Improvement 
Institute (Empresa Renovadora del Cacao) and the National Coffee Institute, 
(Instituto Nacional del Cafe) are essentially engaged in stimulating and 
developing production, but the Coffee Institute has also bought and sold 
this product, and intervenes in coffee processing so as to obtain a higher 
quality export product. Although the results of these activities are not 
entirely satisfactory so far, it is considered that this organization can 
in future play a decisive role in price policy and marketing of coffee. 
Bananas are Ecuador^ most important export product and the country is 
at present the world's largest producer and exporter. Banana production 
has been strongly developed since 1950, both by credit policies of the 
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National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Fomento) and by favourable 
export prices- A National Banana Association (Asociación Nacional de 
Bananeros) has also been created which among other activities intervenes in 
export prices and qualities when exports are restricted. 
The regulation of cotton is handled by the recently established 
National Cotton Commission (Comisión Nacional de Algodón). This Commission 
purchases cotton from farmers and sells it to the textile industry. No 
satisfactory solution has so far been found with respect to cotton, because 
despite the existence of large exportable supplies of certain typos of 
cotton, other qualities of this fibre must still be imported. 
It is considered that in Ecuador there is underconsumption of meat, 
milk, eggs, poultry, and other food products, and at the present level of 
income, current production covers requirements- Thus there is no need for 
price intervention by the Government for these products. 
8. GUATEMALA 
In Guatemala Government intervention in agricultural marketing and price 
fixing is of recent date and limited scope. It began in 1953 with a wheat 
support programme and was followed in 1958 by the regulation of maize 
markets through direct purchases. 
These programmes were carried out by the Production Development Institute  
(Instituto de Fomento de la Producción). Before that, the only significant 
experience in the field of price regulation and distribution of supplies was 
made during the Second World War- These war-time activities were handled 
by the Economic Stabilization Office (Oficina de Estabilización Económica), 
a body that was dissolved later on. 
Nevertheless, primitive marketing practices, lack of adequate storage 
facilities, lack of quality standards for domestic products and the wide 
seasonal fluctuations in the prices of important food products have clearly 
demonstrated the need for market regulations and stabilization. 
The Production Development Institute prepared in the course of its 
first few years of existence plans for the establishment of a network of 
1/ The Production Development Institute (INFOD) was created in 1958 by 
Congressional Decree N° 533• 
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grain elevators and radial silos, and intervened to a limited extent in the 
markets for maize, rice, wheat, flour and some other products, aiming at 
stabilization of their prices-
The wheat development programme began at the end of 1953 and has been 
carried on ever since by the Institute, with the technical assistance of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and of a specialized section of the former that 
works for the development of native areas- Incentive floor prices not 
based on any kind of foraula were being paid and production has increased-
The principal object of the scheme has thus been attained. 
After a period of declining prices due to political reasons, the 
elevator and radial silo .'programme was continued and by 1958 five of these, 
equipped with up-to-date drying and cleaning facilities, had been constructed-
Each of these silos has a capacity of about 7,000 metric tons. 
In the course of the same year, the Institute began to stabilize the 
maize market by purchasing 14,000 metric tons-
In the case of maize, the Institute's farm purchasing price has been 
based on the average of the previous five years' prices to which 25 per 
cent was added as the aim was not merely to stabilize the market, but also 
to increase production. The latter objective was motivated by the decrease 
in coffee prices - Guatemala's foremost export product - which had adversely 
affected the country's balance of payments. It is expected that owing to 
the remunerative price fixed for maize, there will soon be a maize surplus 
for exportation to Central American deficit countries which will bring in 
additional foreign exchange. 
As regards price supports for other' basic products, such as rice and 
beans, no organized programmes are as yet in existence although they enjoy 
state protection through the regulation of imports and exports. It is 
planned that as soon as it becomes possible, the Institute will enter the 
field of stabilization as well as market and price regulation with respect 
to these products. 
As to coffee, Guatemala is a party to the Latin American Agreement for 
the marketing year 1958/59- By virtue of this arrangement, a certain 
proportion of exportable surpluses owned by coffee producers and large 
processors is being retained within the country. The Ministry of 
Agriculture, in cooperation with the Central Coffee Office (Oficina Central 
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del Cafe), ensures that retention measures are actually respected. Coffee 
prices are not being interfered with except for the existence of an export 
duty. 
9• PANAMA 
The problem of agricultural price supports in Panama is closely linked 
with the creation of the Economic Development Institute (Instituto de 
Fomento Econdmico) in 1953• The Institute established a price fixing policy 
for producers as well as for wholesale and retail distribution. Although 
the Institute makes direct purchases at pre-established prices, the system 
is not compulsory.' Producers and merchants engage in private transactions 
their prices being influenced by the purchasing operations of the Institute 
designed to implement the guaranteed producer price- A certain amount of 
stocks of farm produce is also being maintained with the' purpose of 
releasing supplies to the market whenever there is a tendency for prices to 
rise. The Institute sells only to the wholesale trade, and fixes adequate 
margins both for wholesalers and retailers. The Institute handles and 
controls trading in rice, coffee, maize, copra and salt. In almost all 
these products there is ample private trading, salt being the only exception 
as it is practically a monopoly of the Institute. 
The Institute's price policy has been quite successful in stimulating 
Panama's agricultural production. Thus in 1952 total farm product imports 
were valued at almost one million dollars whereas by 1958 the largest 
import items had almost disappeared and exports of farm commodities for an 
amount of $ 600,000 were registered. 
The Economic Development Institute acts also as an agricultural credit 
institution. Its fixed and uniform interest rate is 6 per cent. In the 
beginning of each calendar year the Institute makes an estimate of credit 
needs and establishes its financial policy in accordance with these. As 
private enterprise is active in the marketing of farm produce the Institute 
does not need large funds for its operations. Whatever funds are required 
are provided by the National Bank and the Government owned workers' 
insurance agency (Caja de Seguro Social), the stocks of produce acquired 
by the Institute being used as collateral. 
The Institute maintains its own network of agents and purchasing centres 
and one may therefore reasonably assume that the benefits of incentive 
/prices are 
- 33 -
prices are actually received by the producer- In this manner middlemen 
can still determine prices only in very few limited areas where no agents 
of the Institute exist. Even in these cases at present higher price levels 
are in effect than in previous years-
Prices paid to farmers are fixed as far as possible on the basis of a 
national average of production cost and no attempt is made to relate them to 
world market levels as the domestic market is completely isolated from 
fluctuations on the latter- If there is a need for imports the Institute 
makes them and sells the imported products at price levels fixed for the 
domestic market. Profits made on these operations are passed on to the State-
On the other hand, the Institute is trying to perfect its technical 
and administrative services- At present, it makes its purchases on a 
quality basic; e.g., in the case of rice the price varies according to 
grain sise, humidity and'foreign matter content. 
The Institute operates a network of maize elevators with an annual 
capacity up to 100,000 quintals (of 46 kgs.). For other products storage 
needs are practically nil. 
The Institute gathers statistical data by means of sample surveys, 
particularly in the case of crop forecasts-
The Institute's success in its intervention policy is partly due to 
the valuable help given in its initial stages by specialists from Costa 
Rica, U.S.A., etc. Furthermore, a large group of Panamanian experts has 
received technical training abroad-
10. PERU 
In Peru the policy of price support and stabilization of agricultural 
products has been restricted to ad hoc measures to control prices. These 
measures were in each case fitted to the particular situation encountered. 
The Ministry of Agriculture established and applied them after consultation 
with the organizations representing private interests such as the "Sociedad 
Nacional Agraria", the "Asociación de Ganaderos", the "Asociación de 
Criaderos Lanares", etc., in view of the role private initiative plays in 
the development of the country. 
At present the products which still remain under government control are 
wheat, flour, meat, rice and coffee. With the agreement of producers, a 
special control system also applies to cottonseed, oil and sugar. 
/The measures 
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The measures adopted consisted mainly in ceiling consumer prices, and 
in subsidies to imports paid by the government for those products for which 
there is- a national deficit. In this way domestic prices have been kept 
below international levels in order to meet the purchasing capacity of the 
consumers. These subsidies which obviously represent the difference between 
national and international prices have been interpreted, at times by the 
national producers as a subsidy to foreign producers. In view of the 
increase in demand, Peru has been forced to considerably expand imports of 
foodstuffs. While these imports so far have been made under a favourable 
balance of payments there is a danger that the rapid increase of foodstuff 
imports may ultimately endanger the foreign trade position of the country. 
Being an underdeveloped country, Peru is ma.inly an exporter of raw. 
materials. In this field intervention consists essentially in the taxation 
of exports in order to obtain financial means for keeping domestic consumer 
prices below the. levels of the international market.. When world markets 
for major export products take an unfavourable turn, exports are assisted. 
by the elimination or temporary suspension of the export taxes. These 
policies are established and carried on in cooperation, between the Treasury 
and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Generally price controls in Peru have not produced positive results. 
The development of the agricultural and livestock production has be$n, 
hampered in those cases where controls existed. On the other hand, the. 
elimination of the controls has produced the opposite effects. Consequently 
under present policies the tendency is toward free trade in agricultural 
and livestock products. Trade of some of these products has already been 
liberalized and others will follow in the near future in accordance./with 
possibilities. 
In .very broad terms it might be said that there are in Peru conditions 
which permit the implementation of a national agricultural policy along the 
following lines: 
a) Development of the agricultural and livestock production by 
technical assistance, credit, and by enlarging the areas under 
production. 
b) .Improvement of marketing techniques and liberalization of the 




During the last ten years Venezuela l\as had no clear and definite 
price policy either to stimulate the development of agriculture as a whole 
or to arrest the inflationary process resulting from an increasing demand 
for agricultural products. In spite of this some measures of direct 
protection were taken regarding certain products, among which the custom's 
control, the subsidies to producers, the establishment of bodies to control 
supplies and the use of differential exchange rates for exports should be 
mentioned. Protection to consumers was mainly achieved through facilitating 
imports of certain foodstuffs and raw materials, and through public invest-
ment in the creation and operation of organizations concerned with storing, 
processing and distributing certain domestic or imported agricultural 
products« 
The principal products benefiting from these protective measures are: 
a) Maize and pulses, which are bought by the Agricultural and 
Livestock Bank (Banco Agrícola y Pecuario) at guaranteed and 
remunerative prices, though the limited funds available to this 
institution tend to be reflected in the success these programmes 
have in supporting prices; 
b) Rice production was stimulated by the Venezuelan Development 
Corporation (Corporación Venezolana de Fomento), which used to 
buy this product at remunerative prices. This programme has been 
discontinued; 
c) Coffee and cocoa exports benefit from differential exchange rates 
and guaranteed minimum prices. Both these measures are implemented 
through a transfer of income from mineral oil production; 
d) Milk production is directly subsidized and protected by a mechanism 
obliging merchants to purchase one unit of domestically produced 
preserved milk for each five similar units imported; 
e) Sugar prices are supported through the regulation of supplies in 
the wholesale market, which is implemented by a body in which 
both public and private interests are represented; 
f) No direct support measures exist for tobacco, sesame and cotton, 
but negotiations between the industries concerned and agricultural 
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producers take place annually under the auspices of government 
institutions. This generally results in the determination of 
prices and of the areas to be sown. 
Consumers generally benefit from systems designed to ensure the food 
supply throughout the year, though no price controls exist. 
The storage facilities for rice and maize which are administered by 
the Agricultural and Livestock Bank (Banco Agricola y Pecuario) do not 
only assist producers directly,, bub they also aid in reducing fluctuations 
in consumer prices. These products are sold to wholesalers and to the 
food industries, but further sales are not regulated and consumer prices 
are freely determined. 
Imported products are generally regulated by a system of import 
quotas in order to avoid both monopolies and surpluses, especially when 
the imports are made to complement insufficient domestic production. 
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IV. AGRICULTURAL PRICE AND SUPPORT POLICIES 
IN RELATION TO PRODUCERS 
Two main aspects of agricultural price policies as they affected 
producers were considered by the Centre. 
(i) the level at which producer prices should be stabilized, and the 
best ways of determining this level; 
(ii) the measures taken to ensure that producers do in practice receive 
these prices. 
The Centre also devoted much attention to methods of increasing the 
incentives of farmers to expand production, in ways which did not necessitate 
any regulation of prices, (a) by increasing agricultural productivity and 
reducing production costs, and (b) by increased efficiency of marketing and 
distribution which would give the producer a larger share of the consumers 
total expenditure on food, and release productive resources which could not 
at present be economically utilized. Finally, the Centre gave some consider-
ation to the most suitable balance between the various policy measures as 
they affected producers. 
A. The level of producer price supports 
The mam fa ctor influencing the level at which agricultural prices are 
stabilized is of course the main policy objective of the country at the time-
It was noted earlier that until recently the policies of most countries were 
aimed primarily at keeping down the cost of food to consumers 5 and that the 
tendency was therefore to stabilize prices at a relatively low level. These 
policies were found to result in too slow an expansion of production, and 
more recently they have been considerably modified so that producer prices 
are now being stabilized at appreciably higher levels. Clearly, however, 
farm price .levels cannot be considered in isolation. Their effect, and the 
results of a given level of price stabilization, will depend on many 
interrelationships, e.g. on the relation of farm prices to consumers' incomes 
and buying power, to the general price level in the country, to the prices of 
/farm requisites 
farm requisites and other things entering into the process of production. 
Consideration must also be given to the interrelationships between the prices 
of different farm products, which largely determine the direction of future 
agricultural expansion, and to the relation between domestic prices and those 
ruling on world markets, which greatly influence both the competitiveness 
of the country's agriculture and the methods of price support to be adopted» 
Unless adequate, consideration is given to these factors, the price policy 
of the country may not give the results expected in achieving a balance between 
supplies and the growth of consumer demand, and may indeed lead to serious 
difficulties. 
Two countries^ Argentina and Chile, have recently introduced policies 
maintaining prices generally in line with world market prices« In both 
countries this involved an appreciable increase in producer prices, which . 
under the previous policy had. been maintained below world market levels, For 
a large exporter of agricultural products such as Argentina the risks involved 
in price insulation &,::?o particularly great« If prices are maintained at too 
low a level, export profits and export tax revenue are higher, but production 
may not expand sufficiently and the volume of exports is likely to dwindle. 
If on the other hand, prices are higher than international prices, exportable 
surpluses are likely to increase, but exports will require subsidies® In 
the view of the Argentinian Government, the adjustment of supplies to domestic 
and foreign demand is best achieved by leaving considerable scope to the free 
interplay of supply-demand forces, notably in view of the rather sharp 
competition for resources amongst the various agricultural export products. 
In both Argentina and Chile (wheat), however, the producer is protected 
against too heavy a fall in prices by official minimum prices high enough to 
cover costs of production and maintain the purchasing power of his income. 
Most. countries of the region, however., insulate to some extent domestic 
prices for basic foodstuffs from world market prices., and in contrast to 
earlier policies few now appear to maintain producer price ceilings for the 
protection of consumers. Apart from the growing realisation that an 
expansion of agricultural production is essential for balanced economic 
development, this change partly reflects the decline (in real terms) of world 
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market prices of foodstuffs« During the period of scarcities and high 
prices on world markets there was a need to protect consumers, but now that 
this phase has passed it is producers who are increasingly in need of support. 
In this connexion some delegations maintained that as a result of the 
specific structural conditions of a number of Latin American countries 
production costs were inevitably high, and some degree of protection was 
essential if there was to be adequate investment in agriculture, especially 
as at the present time the prevalence of export subsidies greatly influenced 
world market prices« The shortage and high prices of farm requisites 
(mainly imported), the disproportionate rise in land values (often as a 
hedge against inflation, for reasons of social prestige or for other reasons 
not directly related to the profitability of agriculture), and in some cases 
the sharp rise in farm wages without a comparable rise in productivities, 
were mentioned as factors tending to raise production costs. At the same 
time, it was stressed that the exchange rate controls used in many countries 
of the region made very uncertain any comparison of prices and costs with 
those ruling elsewhere» 
It. was recognised that there was a great need, both by price support and 
non-price measures, to increase the productivity and competitiveness, and to 
reduce the production costs of agriculture in many countries of the region. 
Nevertheless many delegations' considered that too sharp an alignment of 
domestic prices with those on world markets would seriously dislocate their 
economies and discourage further effort towards a more efficient agriculture. 
They considered that price adjustments should be made gradually as producti-
vity increased, and in such a way that both producers and consumers shared 
in the benefits of higher productivity • 
:'As to the methods of establishing official producer prices, a broad 
distinction may be made between two major systems i.e. formula and non-
formula methods. Under formula method^ prices are based on statistically 
assessed facts brought into a definite relationship through the formula. 
Non-formula methods, on the other hand, proceed by weighing all relevant 
factors, often including statistical series, without bringing them into a 
definite relationship, but on an ad hoc basis 3 
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It was generally agreed that the scope for using formulae to determine 
the level of official producer prices was rather limited in Latin American 
countries. Apart from the fact that the necessary statistical data was 
seldom fully available, the more elaborate formulae such as the parity 
formula or the farm income formula were not appropriate to the conditions of 
the region» These formulae were used in countries where a major objective 
of price policies was to raise farm incomes generally to something approaching 
those ruling in other occupations; this was not a feasible objective of 
price policies in Latin American countries for reasons already discussed. 
Most countries of the region have at one time or another attempted to 
fix prices on the basis of the estimated cost of production. Such estimates, 
however, always involve some arbitrary assumptions, and costs inevitably 
vary rather widely from'one region of the country to another, according to 
climate, altitude, size of farm and other factors« Moreover this formula 
can make no allowance for changes in consumer demand. It is less mis-
leading when used solely as a means of estimating the magnitude of changes 
up or down in average production costs, when it approximates to a parity 
formula. Most countries which used production costs as a basis of price 
fixing have now turned to other methods: Chile and Costa Rica are examples. 
Argentina still uses the system, but is now considering to take into account 
parity price indices since these are more dynamic and are more directly 
related to industrial prices. This is mentioned in thè considerations of 
the Decree for the fixing of the base price for wheat for the 1958/59 crop. 
In Chile, a new and comparatively flexible type of formula has been 
developed for wheat prices, which seems well adapted to the conditions typical 
of many countries of the region, such as monetary instability, frequent 
revision of statistical series, etc. Under this formula variations in 
official producer prices are determined with the help of the probable general 
price level in the country at harvest time. The general price level is 
determined by a combination of the cost of living and general wholesale price 
index. In addition the changes in an index or the cost of inputs into wheat 
production are determined from year to year. The average of these two 
indices provides the percentage of variation necessary in the official wheat 
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price. Since 1956 the base period for these indices, namely 1934-48, has 
been replaced by a moving average of the ten immediately preceding years. 
It is believed that by this method the purchasing power of the official 
wheat price is maintained. At the same time, the moving average base period, 
while avoiding abrupt year to year fluctuations in price, enables account 
to be taken.automatically of the current revision of the statistical series 
and indices and of the demand-supply changes as expressed in the general 
price index» 
The latter point deserves particular emphasis. Most formula methods . 
have shown in practice a tendency to rigidity. Thus the cost of production 
formula does not take into account changes in demand, while the parity 
formula takes little account of changes in supply and demand and also in 
productivity,, In the less developed countries with relatively high price 
and income elasticities of demand, with limited funds, for support measures, 
and where there are often marked fluctuations in consumer incomes and monetary 
instability, flexibility in price fixing is of particular importance. 
A new formula recently introduced in Canada, which takes no account of 
the level of farm incomes, or the purchasing power of farm prices, but only 
of changes in demand-supply conditions, also seems to provide greater 
flexibility than the older formulae. Under this formula, minimum producer 
prices are based on a moving average of market prices for a determined number 
of years preceding the year for which the prices are fixed. Without, 
guaranteeing a fixed margin over cost of production, this formula nevertheless 
gives the producer a fair degree of price security, smooths out excessive 
fluctuations, and appears to ease the adjustment of supplies to demand. This 
method comes very close to the non-formula method under which prices are 
based on the experience of market prices during the past, as for example in 
Guatemala. 
Most countries of Latin America, however, establish official producer 
prices for basic foods on fairly flexible ad hoc methods, taking into account, 
however, some statistical series, notably estimates of the cost of production. 
In some countries, e.g. Costa Rica and Panama, prices are not allowed to fall 
below the estimated cost of production, though this is not the only factor 
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taken into account in price fixing. Against the greater flexibility of 
ad hoc methods, however, must be set a lower degree of security to producers 
(which may discourage investment) in comparison with formulae methods, though 
this may be avoided if a maximum is set to the permissible decline in the 
farm price in any one year, as in the United Kingdom* Again, where 
inflationary conditions prevail, it seems important to give the farmer some 
automatic security against a decline in the purchasing power of the official 
price. 
On the whole, it appears that for the time being producer prices are best 
established to a considerable extent on a basis of experience, taking fully 
into account both producer and consumer aspects, and attempting to balance 
as closely as possible supplies and requirements. For example, if stocks 
accumulate excessively, or if surpluses emerge consistently (and not only 
occasionally in years of heavy crops) which can be disposed of only by means 
of subsidized exports, it seems an indication that the producer price is too 
high. If or: the contrary imports have to be greatly stepped up, or if 
shortages lead to inflationary pressures in retail markets, it seems an 
indication that producer prices are too low. If the production of one 
commodity grows too quickly and of another too slowly, it is an indication 
that their price relationship is wrong. The extent of the price adjustment 
necessary to correct these defects can probably be found only by trial and 
error. At the same time that flexibility is preserved, excessively large 
changes in price levels which may undermine the security and confidence of 
farmers are to be avoided. • 
The system which is now being introduced in Colombia, under which official 
prices are to be fixed at a level that balances supply and demand, appears to 
pursue this objective, though clearly such a balance can be struck at more 
than one price level. Under it, the costs of production factors are taken 
into account. Above this level prices are allowed to move freely, except 
that any excessive rise of consumer prices is checked on an ad hoc basis by 
Government releases of supplies from stocks or imports. 
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It was further noted, that price guarantees could not protect producers 
against a heavy fall of their incomes in the case of serious crop failure, 
and that several countries of the region had introduced or were considering 
schemes of crop and livestock insurance as a supplement to price supports. 
Experience suggests, however, that such schemes, though of considerable value 
to farmers, can seldom be operated on a self-supporting basis. 
®• How are Official Producer Price Levels Maintained 
Almost all countries in Latin America have some programmes for assuring 
that the producers actually will realize prices at harvest time in line with 
their price policies. These programmes usually provide for government 
purchase and storage when market prices at harvest otherwise would fall 
below the announced level. As pointed out earlier the prices of the basic 
food crops within the countries are insulated from world price levels by 
import and export quotas and are often maintained at levels designed to 
encourage increased production. There was much variation noted, however, 
in the comprehensiveness of programmes for assuring producers favourable prices 
at harvest time. 
Most agricultural producers are very small and often are heavily in debt, 
therefore they have no alternative to selling their crops immediately at 
harvest time. It was agreed that under these conditions it is especially , 
important to have comprehensive programmes for assuring the small producers 
prices at harvest time in line with announced stabilization levels. 
Comprehensive and fully satisfactory programmes must include (l) announce-
ment of the minimum assured price level in advance of planting programmes, 
(2) adequate supplies of government credit at reasonable rates of interest 
- with a view to avoiding excessive indebtedness - for use in the purchase 
of fertilizer, improved seeds, tools and implements, (3) a system of purchasing 
centres available to all producers as an alternative to accepting excessively 
low prices at harvest from corniercial traders, (4) sufficient (and adapted) 
commercial and government storage capacity to prevent spoilage of the crops 
from harvest time until they are utilized by the consumers, (5) sufficient 
government funds to finance the purchase and storage of as much of the crops 
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at harvest time as is necessary to stabilize prices at the minimum announced 
levels, and finally (6) efficient and timely administration of the programme 
with emphasis on the full coordination of all the parts mentioned above. 
Several countries, notably Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile, Panama and 
Venezuela reported government programmes, including the construction of 
storage facilities and the supplementation of private business enterprise 
with government purchasing centres in ordejr to assure all producers an 
opportunity to market their products at favourable prices. Countries with 
the most experience have adopted quality standards in their purchase 
programmes and have encouraged private business enterprise to adopt similar 
quality standards. There was general agreement that quality standards are 
an essential part of plans assuring producers agreed minimum prices at 
harvest time* 
In most countries the assurance of minimum prices at harvest is limited 
to a few of the more important storage foods such as maize, wheat, rice and 
beans* Several countries, however, have been successful in maintaining 
price stabilization programmes for potatoes, and other perishable products. 
The more perishable fruits and vegetables, although subject to great 
fluctuations in price, could not be stored. Some countries have attempted 
improved marketing programmes for these products in an effort to reduce 
price fluctuations, but it has been impossible for governments to adopt 
policies for the perishable products comparable to their programmes for 
the storable grains. 
Many countries reported programmes for the development of the dairy 
industry including the assurance of favourable prices- It was noted that 
producer and marketing cooperatives often played an important role in 
dairying and were utilized by the governments in carrying out price policies 
in this field- The wider use of cooperatives in carrying out price policies 
for other products was suggested by several delegates-
The role of import quotas in determining the general level of domestic 
production and prices is crucial. Many countries have well organized 
statistical bases for determining, desirable annual revisions in the level 
of import quotas. When production exceeds domestic consumption needs for 




In general, the level of live cattle prices and the price of meat is 
maintained in Latin American countries only by their import and export quotas. 
Only a few countries set minimum prices for live cattle although maximum 
consumer prices on meat are in effect in a number of countries. Several 
countries -are developing slaughterhouse and cold storage facilities as a 
means of stabilizing the supplies of meat for their consumers and as a means 
of stabilizing prices for their producers. 
In many cases much of the gains in increased production which might be 
expected by a given price policy are lost because of uncertainty with respect 
to government actions in setting import or export quotas, to delays in the 
announcement of the minimum price level to be supported,, to delays in credit 
programmes, to a lack of funds and personnel to carry out the programme, or 
uncertainty about the imposition of consumer price ceilings by another branch 
of the government. 
It was agreed that for complete success governments must announce their 
price policies in advance of the planting season, they must have well 
developed programmes for assuring producers the opportunity of realizing the 
announced prices at harvest time and they must achieve the necessary coordin-
ation among all its branches to carry out fully and on time, all announced 
price policies. 
Only in this way do producers learn to have confidence in the announced 
price policies of the government. When such confidence is achieved a greater 
production will be realized at lower price levels to consumers. 
C. Indirect Agricultural Support Measures 
Latin American experience would seem to indicate that measures exclusi-
vely intended to regulate prices may produce results which do not fully meet 
the objectives of an agricultural stabilization and support policy in under-
developed countries. In such cases, the problem, briefly, is the following: 
on the one hand, the rate of agricultural expansion has not kept pace with 
increases in population and income levels; on the other hand, great masses 
of relatively low-income consumers are insufficiently fed. 
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Agricultural price and stabilization policies therefore must reconcile 
two apparently contradictory objectives: first, to provide farmers with the 
necessary incentives to increase production, which requires establishing 
remunerative prices for the producer, and secondly, to benefit the low-income 
sections of the population by improving their nutritional levels. To this 
end, low consumer prices on foodstuffs must be maintained. In addition to 
the stabilization programmes mentioned earlier the reconciliation of these 
twin objectives lies to a large extent in measures to improve the efficiency 
and to reduce the costs both of production and marketing. 
Measures to increase the efficiency of .production 
In underdeveloped countries in general it is not possible to make large 
transfer payments from one sector.of the economy to another. If incentives 
are given to agricultural producers, as the major part of the national inccme 
comes from them, it is usually found that in the end the very sector that is 
to be favoured has to pay the cost. If low consumer prices are to be 
maintained, there is a resultant danger of discouraging production. From 
the foregoing it is clear that in Latin American conditions price control 
methods should be complemented by others of a different character that may 
be designated as indirect support measures. These are meant to raise the 
net income of the producer increasing agricultural productivity and by 
lowering the costs of production. Other measures are designed to avoid any 
sharp drops in incomes by protecting farmers against losses caused by 
extremes of weather. 
Indirect support measures tend to break the vicious circle operating as 
follows in a great part of the area: small income levels conducive to only 
a low rate of savings and investment cause low productivity, and a resultant 
inability to raise incomes. 
The Centre considered that indirect support measures should receive 
special attention in Latin American countries as they tend to remove some of 
the obstacles impeding agricultural development. Moreover, subsistence 
farmers not included in the monetary economy of a country can be encouraged 
in this way, while they benefit little from measures that only affect the 
price of a commodity. 
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The Centre discussed specifically three methods of indirect support: 
subsidies to the factors of production; credit; and crop insurance* There 
are, however, others, such as land improvement through irrigation, drainage, 
eradication of weeds and other pests; reform of deficient agrarian structure; 
establishment of experimental and extension services, etc., all of which 
are long term measures. The Centre also referred to possible fiscal measures, 
which by reducing or adjusting the incidence of direct and indirect taxation, 
including sales taxes, ensure higher farm incomes without affecting prices. 
The Centre considered that one of the most efficient methods to improve 
productivity and the farmers' final income is by subsidizing or otherwise 
reducing the costs of input factors which represent a considerable part of 
production costs, Latin American experience shows that such measures if 
properly applied', give very satisfactory results since they do not require 
as large an investment of public funds as to indirect producer or consumer 
price subsidies. 
In many countries of the region subsidies have been given, or remission 
of taxation cr import deposits granted, for the purchase of machinery, tools 
and other requisites, fertilizers, pesticides, improved seeds or breeding 
animals, etc« The subsidy may be made available directly by selling these 
articles at lower than market prices through governmental agencies, or 
indirectly by exempting these from customs duties when they are not produced . 
domestically. 
In several countries, the high cost of input factors is the result of 
shortages due to import difficulties attributable to lack of foreign exchange. 
These items should receive preferential treatment through import quotas, 
licences, preferential rates of exchange, etc. Care should also be taken 
to make sure that the benefits of these measures go to the farmers instead 
of being absorbed by importers and distributors. Certain countries of the 
region have established machine stations which lend their services to farmers 
at low cost, particularly for heavy work such as land clearing and breaking. 
Some of the countries represented suggested that negotiations between Latin 
American countries and countries exporting farm machinery should take place 
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through the good offices of FAO or other international organizations, with 
a view to achieving the reduction or suspension of export taxes on farm 
machinery which would result in a reduction of their cost to underdeveloped 
countries. 
Credit is the most common form of extending aid to farmers in Latin 
America, In many of the participating countries mechanisms created for this 
purpose compare well with those of any country, including some of those most 
highly developed. If farm credit allows producers to expand the scale of 
their operations, if it is timely and if its terms are reasonable so as to 
keep production costs within reasonable limits, it will then contribute to 
increasing the net income of the farmer. 
In Mexico, a condition for receiving operation credits frpm a government 
owned bank is to insure crops and livestock against all risks. The premium 
is considered as part of the loan. The insurance system is all inclusive in 
that it covers all the crops and livestock on the farm. 
In Brazil too, though on a smaller scale, similar insurance is available, 
while Costa Rica is at present planning the establishment of all risk coverage 
for crops and livestock. In Uruguay, insurance may be taken out for certain 
risks connected with cattle breeding. In almost all these cases, public 
funds are used to maintain the systems and to make the cost of the insurance 
attractive to low-income farmers. 
Insurance of this type represents an additional collateral for credit 
which otherwise could not be obtained. It also prevents farm incomes from 
falling drastically if the main crops fail. 
The Centre recognized the need for giving more attention to indirect 
farm support measures as a means to accelerate agricultural development in 
the region and raise farmers1 incomes without increasing consumer prices. 
These measures may become a valuable tool of farm policy, and the Centre 
considered it advisable for countries to consult with FAO and other inter-
national organizations for the purpose of coordinating such policies on a • 
region-wide basis, so that balanced development of the region and better 
resource utilization might be achieved. 
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Indirect Support Measures in the Field of Marketing 
The Centre explored several aspects of the marketing process that were 
considered to show promise of contributing toward the achievement of the 
twofold aim of securing a more rapid expansion of production without raising 
the cost of food to consumers. 
In the field of transport, the construction of feeder roads was una-
nimously described as an important means of increasing production. 
Practically all of the countries represented have more or less complete plans 
for opening up potential zones of production through road construction. In 
Venezuela a programme of this type has been carried forward energetically 
since 1948 with outstanding results. In Costa Rica two per cent of Government 
taxes collected on liquors has for years been employed toward this end and 
in Colombia the opening of the Atlantic highway has greatly speeded up the 
movement of cattle with attendant reduction of weight losses in transit and 
corresponding gains for the farmer while even some reduction of meat prices 
in terms of real values has become possible. 
• The Chilean delegation reported that in their country high transport 
costs were a considerable obstacle to the efficient marketing of agricultural 
products, a condition that is at present under review and for which solutions 
seem to be in the offing. In Costa Rica the Production Development Council 
(Consejo de Fomento de la Producción) pays outright transport subsidies. 
The assembling and marketing of agricultural commodities through farmers' 
marketing cooperatives plays a relatively unimportant role in Latin America. 
One of the few successful examples is Panama where livestock producers have 
created marketing cooperatives with proper slaughterhouses and butcher's shops 
and many more such organizations are in the process of formation. Cattlemen 
have greatly increased their receipts although selling at lower prices than 
private outlets. Far-reaching Government intervention is more usual than 
cooperatives, and there is some type of semi.-autonomous or similar official 
marketing agency in practically all countries of the region. These some-
times deal with a large number of articles and in other instances there is 
a series of commodity organizations whose aim it is to buy directly from 
producers and sell through wholesale and even retail channels to consumers 
in order to eliminate middlemen and thus secure better prices for farmers 
and maintain stable or reasonable ones at the consumer level. 
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Most of these organizations own storage and conditioning facilities, 
sometimes even processing plants and a network of retail distribution 
agencies. In some cases they sell through private retail channels reserving 
for themselves the right of fixing profit margins or sales price to consumers. 
This type of regulation exists e.g. in Colombia and Costa Rica and implies 
at times official subsidization of consumer prices complemented with imports 
or exports on special terms. In Guatemala, similar intervention is entrusted 
to commodity organizations, some of which are of a cooperative nature, such 
as e.g. the Cotton Producers' Cooperative Society (Asociación Cooperativa 
de Algodoneros) and the Sugarcane Growers1 Cooperative Society (Asociación 
Cooperative de Cañeros). In Venezuela there are official purchasing 
programmes and a vast network of storage facilities but distribution has not 
been duly organized0 
In Cuba special farmers' markets have been organized and are success-
fully functioning, whereas in Chile a given area of market places has been< 
reserved for producers in the hope that they might get a better net income 
through elimination of huckster's profits. In actual practice many of them 
have given up farming and become hucksters instead. 
In Venezuela the provision of ample storage facilities has completely 
changed the structure of agricultural production. While formerly cash crops 
were only grown as a side-line of subsistence farms, after the establishment 
of the Government storage network commercial production had taken great 
strides. In several.countries a number of products formerly in short supply 
have developed exportable surpluses after the construction of elevators. 
Officially sponsored and privately owned meat packing plants, milk 
processing facilities, etc. have greatly contributed to the achievement of 
reconciling income gains for producers with reasonable consumer price levels 
in Chile and some other countries of the region. 
The existence of monopolies and various market levies or exactions 
have greatly interfered with the attainment of these aims. In various 
countries a whole series of legally protected middlemen who perform little 
service has grown up within the marketing system. In almost every Latin 
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American country Municipal authorities are levying heavy dues from post- . 
holders in market places at the cost of both producers and consumers. In 
Ecuador and Peru road tolls are imposed upon merchandise transported by 
road, sometimes by several municipalities in succession. 
An important production incentive that is frequently part of the basic 
mechanism of price support consists in making the granting of import licenses 
to local industries conditional upon full absorption of domestically produced 
agricultural raw materials. Such arrangements exist e.g. in Colombia for 
wheat for which INA has the import monopoly. In Guatemala and Ecuador 
millers are required to use domestic and imported wheat in equal proportions 
and this measure has been followed by an increase in wheat production within 
a few years. 
Obligatory grading of wheat and meat in Argentina has brought about more 
remunerative prices for farmers while consumers obtained better value for 
their money. 
Vertical integration through contract farming in the case of brewers1 
barley, oils and fats, sugarcane and beets, etc, has greatly benefited 
farmers in most Latin American countries, although some apprehension was 
expressed that monopoly positions might later develop out of these arrangements. 
On the other hand the recent multiplying of super-markets in many countries 
has been described as a powerful influence in securing better returns for 
farmers while reducing retail prices as a result of- savings effected by 
economies of the scale. Many of these super-markets-buy directly from farmers 
and some even have processing plants. 
There has been a notable lack of mention in the Centre of marketing 
agreements or mandatory marketing schemes. Oh the contrary, the trend seems 
to be for some relaxation of direct market and price controls in Chile and 
Peru, In Argentina, the final goal is to re-establish free markets elimin-
ating all measures affecting prices, trade or free competition. On the 
other hand, all control measures necessary to prevent that the functioning 




The general conclusion seems to be that on the side of marketing, 
Governments could best contribute toward the attainment of higher agricul-
tural returns without prejudice to consumer interests by constructing feeder 
roads; by the provision of storage facilities, packing and processing plants; 
ice factories and similar accessory equipment; and eliminating monopolies« 
However, it was generally admitted that no firm bases or studies existed 
in practically any Latin American country represented at the Centre, for the 
determination of the most economical single measure or combination of these 
in a given situation. The desirability of creating marketing associations or 
committees in each country was emphasized in this connexion, as one means 
of promoting serious investigations of this type. 
D. Appraisal of Producer Price Support Policies 
for Products for Domestic Markets 
There was general agreement among the delegates attending the Centre 
that direct and indirect producer price policies have achieved a measure of 
success in all Latin American countries. Agricultural output has increased 
and consumer food supplies are more ample as a result of the price policies 
in effect in recent years. 
When however,-the producer price policies were derived from consumer 
price ceilings set at low levels in an endeavour to ease the economic position 
of the consumer, the development of production often proved to be inadequate 
and led to shortages and increased problems of external payments. 
The desired level of agricultural output has not yet been reached, 
however, except in the case of a very few products -in a limited number of 
commodities. As the development of agricultural output is continued either 
by direct or indirect policies it becomes especially necessary to maintain 
an appropriate balance in the output of the different agricultural products. 
A guiding rule is that the output of each product should be developed 
to the point that resources used to obtain the final increment of output for 
each product should realize equal returns. If the capital and labour employed 
to obtain additional increases in the output of wheat or maize fail to give 
a return equal to that obtained by an equal amount of capital and labour 
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employed in increasing cattle production, then an imbalance exists. Too 
much capital and labour are going into wheat and maize production. These 
resources might better be employed in increasing cattle output. The same 
rule applies with respect to the proper emphasis on crops for domestic u,se 
as against crops for export» In applying this rule trends in output and 
demand need to be taken into account as well as the situation which exists 
at a particular time. 
In many Latin American countries an inadequate agrarian structure reduces 
the effectiveness of both the direct price policies and the indirect measures 
employed to increase productivity and the efficiency of marketing. 
Changes in the agrarian structure and in institutional factors can be 
brought about only slowly. Nevertheless, it is important to continue studies 
of these factors and studies of ways and means of reducing their adverse 
effects on the rationalization of agricultural output. 
Several delegates reported land reform programmes under way or under 
discussion by their governments. In some cases land reform measures must be 
carried out before the full effect of price policies in producing the desired 
increases in agricultural output can be obtained. 
It was generally agreed that a balance must be maintained between the 
funds and human effort apportioned to direct producer price supports and 
measures aimed at increasing farm incomes by greater productivity and by 
increased efficiency in marketing. Undue emphasis on any one of these 
programmes will yield small results as compared with a carefully balanced 
approach. Moreover it is necessary to review the several programmes year 
after year and change the emphasis from one to another from time to time to 
achieve the greatest result's with limited funds. 
Almost every country in the region has taxation policies, commerce 
regulations or outdated credit institutions which have adverse effects on 
agricultural productivity and efficient marketing. It is urgent that these 
institutional factors which have adverse effects on programmes for increasing 
productivity be studied intensively to determine the most appropriate policies 
for minimizing their adverse effects. 
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The foregoing paragraphs indicate that there remain many opportunities • -
for the improvement and the greater coordination of direct price policies 
and indirect measures for increasing farm output and marketing efficiency. 
Reforms in the agrarian structure and in tenancy practice are needed in many 
countries. Reforms also are needed in such institutional barriers to rapid 
agricultural development as outmoded tax, commerce and credit policies. 
Equally important continuing review of programmes and policies is needed 
to assure the maintenance of a proper balance in the output of the different 
crops and livestock products. 
/V, CONSUMER 
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V. CONSUMER PRICE POLICIES 
The.principal direct aim of Latin American consumer price policies 
is to. ensure a minimum diet for low income populations. In addition, 
policy makers have been concerned to avoid by the adoption of such 
measures any slackening of industrial development in the region, that 
might arise from more costly food and consequent higher wage levels. 
While this endeavour implies considerable sacrifices and effort in any 
case, in Latin America it is particularly difficult to carry it into 
practice because of rapid population growth especially in urban centres, 
monetary and administrative instability and widely fluctuating crop yields 
in tropical and semitropical countries, combined with storage problems , 
due to excessive prevalence of insect pests and other ecological factors. 
With the exception of a few Central American countries, most nations 
in the region are vast in size and often contain extensive zones of very 
difficult access. This difference in size often determines the type 
of consumer price policy adopted. 
In Central America, where most countries are small, regulation of 
market supplies by means of buffer stocks is fairly common. In Costa 
Rica this covers grains and some other crops. In Guatemala about 
50 per cent of the annual wheat crop and 5 to 8 per cent of maize is 
bought up by the Government and held in reserve for market stabilization 
purposes; when necessary additional supplies are introduced from abroad 
and sold at cost. Often the mere knowledge that sufficient stocks are 
being held by the official price support agency is enough to prevent 
prices from rising. In Panama the Government has a continuing policy 
of maintaining buffer stocks of rice, coffee and maize for price 
stabilization purposes. 
Among other Latin American countries, Colombia has a fairly well 
organized system of this kind handled by the National Supply Institute 
(INA). This organization buys up substantial quantities of wheat, maize, 
rice, beans and even potatoes at harvest time and covprs by imports any 
deficit in these commodities, as well as a few others. When markets 
are in short supply, INA releases these stocks gradually as soon as 
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prices show a tendency to rise» It also tries to favour consumers 
by purchasing basic foodstuffs in remote, areas and making them available 
in consumption centres when most needed. In Chile "INACO", an official 
trading agency also stores wheat and releases it to millers as required, 
in support of its fixed price policy, to make it effective. Similarly 
in Argentina, the National Grain Board, after having recently with-
drawn from exercising control over other products, is still purchasing 
wheat and. maintaining stockpiles, in. order to avoid sharp rises in the 
price of flour or flour products. 
Another method of consumer price stabilization that is commonly 
applied in the region is the granting of subsidies. These generally 
consist in imports of foodstuffs in short supply purchased at the ruling 
world market price or from surplus stocks at special termsj the former 
generally being made available to domestic consumers, sometimes below 
cost, while on the latte;r import duties and other charges are often 
waived by the Government« At other times, especially when high producer 
prices are being maintained within a country for farmers* benefit, imported 
stocks are resold by official agencies at higher than world market prices, 
in order not to jeopardize the returns of domestic producers* In such 
cases a net profit is made, but consumers benefit in that prices are not 
allowed to rise. This system is in force, e.g., in Costa Rica* In 
Colombia imports of wheat and hydrogenated fat are a monopoly of INA 
and they are not subject to import duty and other charges« Much wheat 
is obtained from U.S. surplus stocks at special terms and sold at the 
higher domestic price level that serves as an incentive for domestic 
producers. Part of the profits made is then used for bringing from 
abroad foodstuffs in short supply and selling them below cost if necessary* 
Another portion of profits is used for domestic price support purposes, 
and when stocks acquired in the course of these operations are released 
at less than cost the result is a subsidy to consumers. In Argentina, 
the Government for a time covered all losses incurred by its packing 
plant*s meat sales at fixed ceiling prices, but this form of subsidy was 
abolished not only for meat but all othpr subsidized products early in 
1957« In Venezuela milk is subsidized* 
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In various countries where multiple exchange rates were still in 
effect when the Centre was meeting, consumer subsidies have taken the 
form of imports at preferential exchange rates, at times accompanied 
by export restrictions in order to prevent scarcities and consequent 
price increases on domestic markets. In Paraguay a virtual Government 
monopoly of the cattle and meat trade has been in existence for years 
with the object of maintaining low domestic prices through a strict 
rationing of exports» The consumer subsidy in this case is a direct 
burden to producers and t^ he economy as a whole as export values are about 
double the domestic price© 
By far the most common method of regulating the cost of basic 
foodstuffs between the Korean war and until about 1958 was the imposition 
of price ceilings enforced largely at the retail level and sometimes 
wholesale as well under penalty of fines, closure of contravening sales 
outlets and other threats. Lately, however, such measures have been , 
gradually removed in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and some other countries. 
In Costa Rica,- the Ministry of Economy still fixes compulsory maximum 
wholesale and retail prices for a whole series of products. In Chile 
ceiling prices are now imposed only temporarily whenever the cost of 
a given basic article shows a sharp tendency to increase. In such 
cases restrictions are removed as soon as sufficient supplies become 
available from domestic sources or from abroad. In Argentina, nowadays, 
only wheat has virtually a fixed price, although a minimum price is 
guaranteed to producers, however the Government practically has the 
purchasing monopoly. Nevertheless it is possible, as alreaciy announced 
by the authorities, that the Government fixes ceiling prices at economic 
levels for some major consumer products whenever the circumstances make 
this desirable. In Panama, the Government still imposes maximum prices 
on practically all domestic and imported farm products and in some cases 
makes adequate supplies available to the trade. Thus, satisfactory 
results were obtained, but ceilings were ineffective whenever the 
Government failed to release stocks in time. 
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Reviewing the experiences with the several support methods outlined 
above, the Centre came to the following conclusions. Export controls and 
subsidized imports, if properly handled, usually produce satisfactory 
results and do not require excessive administrative machinery. In the 
smaller countries price ceilings are more likely to be effective than in the 
larger ones, provided that they are complemented by buffer stock operations 
or regulations of imported supplies, and that there is no runaway inflation 
at the time of their application. Consumer subsidies once granted cannot 
be removed easily, they benefit all income groups not only those in need 
of assistance, and for this reason e.g. Chile has recently withdrawn the 
subsidies and replaced them by higher family allowances. They sometimes 
lead to high and often wasteful consumption, as for example in Argentina' 
as regards meat® 
Any of the above methods is likely to be reflected in lower prices and 
incomes for farmers unless a thoroughly effective and fully financed price 
support system is in operation«, . The selection of the most adequate 
mechanism that would best suit each individual countryrs need, as well as 
its efficient administration, are often seriously hampered by lack or 
scarcity af timely, and in some cases even of basic, statistical data, 
market information and marketing research in general. Another serious • 
obstacle is the frequency with which the Governments succeed each other in 




VI. PRICE POLICIES FOR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
A. Objectives 
Export price policies usually pursue the following objectives: 
(a) to maximize foreign exchange earnings; 
(b) to raise Government revenue; 
(c) to maintain the competitiveness of the export industry; • 
(d) to minimize the impact of world market fluctuations on 
the economy as a whole and on farmers income. 
In times, of high world market prices these four objectives are obtained 
through flexible, export taxation. The effects of a decline in world market 
prices are levelled off through partial or complete tax remission* If 
international prices.decline to uneconomic levels or domestic prices rise 
above world market levels some form of support, either through export 
subsidies or stockpiling becomes necessary. 
During the post war years world market prices in real terms have been 
generally favourable for the agricultural export products of the region, and 
although they have declined during the past few years, they remain appreciably 
higher than during the nineteea thirties. Export price policies were there-
fore largely devised as systems of variable taxation. 
Subsidies to exports, on the other hand, are rare in the region because 
as a ru}.e countries cannot afford to maintain the prices of their export 
products above the world market level. In some cases, however, agricultural 
exports are supported by subsidies. In Venezuela, for example, the coffee 
and cocoa industry, on which a large section of the<population depends for 
its income, has become less competitive, largely as a result of high cost 
of. labour and of low productivity, and the exports of thesevtwo products 
can only be maintained through subsidies. In Uruguay wheat surpluses are 
produced under and incentive scheme and exported with the help of subsidies 
in order to increase foreign exchange earnings. In both countries the funds 
for these subsidies stem from taxes on prosperous export industries, oil 
and wool respectively. In some countries, (Panama), marginal export surpluses 
arise under food selfsufficiency schemes, under which prices are raised 
above the world market level. In other countries, Cuba for example, new 
export industries are developed with the help of export subsidies with a 
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view to reducing the dependence of the country on one single major product. 
B. Methods 
Very flexible methods are clearly required to maintain a reasonable 
balance between these various objectives, and four main systems have 
developed in the region: 
1) regulation of the volume of exports; 
2) State export agencies; 
3) multiple and variable exchange rates; 
4) the "aforo" system. 
The regulation of the volume of exports has no objective other than 
price stabilization. It can only be used by countries supplying a very 
large share of world trade or under international commodity agreements, 
such as the Sugar Agreement and the Coffee Agreement. Control of export 
volume under these two agreements is achieved by export quotas. This 
method may involve burdensome stockpiling. In Cuba, therefore, acreage 
restrictions are imposed for sugar cane with a view to keeping production 
in line with demand. 
A State Export Agency may be used to control the volume of exports, 
to tax exports, and in emergency to subsidize exports. The Agency purchases 
at fixed prices and the margin between these prices and the export prices 
represents the tax or subsidy. Through variation of the purchasing price 
production may be guided in relation to demand. 
Multiple and variable exchange rates may be used for the purpose of 
taxation or subsidy. Instead of one exchage rate reflecting the foreign 
purchasing power of the currency, different rates are applied to individual 
commodities or groups of commodities according to their competitiveness on 
world markets. If world prices or domestic production costs change 
significantly the exchange rate may be varied in accordance with current 
circumstances. Multiple and variable exchange rates are the method most 
widely used in the region to influence the returns of exporters from 
agricultural exports. 
Multiple exchange rates make it hard to judge the real relation of 
domestic to international prices and costs. An actual subsidy would only 
arise, where the special export rate were higher (in national currency) 
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than a single rate representing the foreign purchasing power of the currency» 
With the lack of such a single rate comparison can only be made more or less 
approximately. As in the majority of agricultural exports taxation rates 
apply, devaluations of such rates represent a partial or complete remission 
of taxation rather than an export subsidy- In Costa Rica, for example, the 
official rates applying to major exports (coffee, bananas) and to essential 
imports represent a tax on the farmer and a subsidy to the latter. The free 
rate, on the other hand, represents a subsidy on exports and a tax on imports. 
However, most minor agricultural exports, such as the marginal surpluses 
of basic food crops arising from time to time under the incentive scheme 
to production, enjoy a mixed rate: 35 to 65 per cent of the foreign exchange 
earned can be sold by the exporter on the free exchange market. The free 
rate is approximately 20 per cent higher than the official rate, and the 
cross rates, through which exports of these products are eased, are some 
6 to 10 per cent higher than the official rate- If Costa Rica applied a 
single rate, this rate would probably come very close to the cross rates. 
These rates, therefore appear to involve export tax remissions rather than 
export subsidies. Similar considerations may apply to some other countries, 
where apparent subsidies apply through multiple rates- In Venezuela, 
however, the coffee and cocoa rates are higher than any other rate and 
represent an outright export subsidy. 
The "aforo" system is purely a variable export tax method and can be 
used for no other purpose- It was devised in Mexico to provide the export 
tax system with the flexibility necessitated by the fluctuating world market 
prices of their exports. The basic export tax, and particularly special 
export taxes introduced at the time of the two currency devaluations of 
194S and 1954 are levied on an officially fixed but varying export price, 
instead of on the actual price, in order to increase or reduce the export 
tax with world market trends. If necessary, further relief is granted by 
a reduction or temporary complete remission of the tax- In recent years, 
some countries, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, combined the multiple exchange 
rate system with an "aforo"• Here the "afore" indicated the portion of the 
export price for which the exporter had to surrender the foreign exchange 
earned at the official rate. The difference between the "aforo" and the 
actual price could be sold on the free exchange market. The system, in 
/practice, amounted 
- 62 -
practice, amounted to cross rates between the official and the free 
exchange rate. The purpose was to make the multiple rate system more flexible. 
In Argentina it resulted in a very great number of different rates. In this 
country it was combined with minimum price guarantees to producers and used 
by the Governments mostly to maintain exports competitive through tax 
remission and to avoid support purchasing. 
The results obtained by these various methods in terms of the objectives 
sought were greatly different in the various countries. This is only partly 
due to advantages or disadvantages inherent in the method, much of the 
success or failure of the method is the result of the way in which it was 
operated. 
A State Export Agency in theory is particularly well equipped to achieve 
all the objectives of export price policies. In Argentina, however, the 
export monopoly operating in the ten year period 1946 to 1956 for all 
agricultural produce with the exception of wool, was not successful in 
achieving its objectives, because it resulted in an excessive taxation of 
agriculture for the benefit of general economic development* This, combined 
with a sharp decline in exports because of reduced output and larger 
consumption caused by various socio-economic factors resulted in the loss 
of traditional export markets. 
Under multiple exchange rate systems modifications in rates necessitated 
by changes of production costs or world market prices were often delayed so 
long as to seriously hamper exports. Moreover, devaluations of exchange 
rates for major exports lead to a rise in import prices and often to a rise 
in the general price and cost level in the country. In other instances, 
pressure from the producers and exporters resulted in a kind of inflationary 
exchange rate spiral adding to the existing inflationary pressure. Multiple 
exchange rates also tend to encourage speculation and they introduce an 
element of uncertainty and risk into business transactions which is liable 
to inhibit both sellers and buyers. 
Generally, the method of multiple rates worked satisfactorily where 
it was used to subsidize exports as in Venezuela. It also raises less 
problems and difficulties under conditions of monetary stability and where 
the range of rates is rather limited. In Costa Rica, for example, the free 
market rate is stabilized through exchange purchasing and selling by the 
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Bank of Costa Rica since the beginning of the 1950ls and the range of 
rates is moderate. The system is used to provide a flexible means of ad-
justment to world market fluctuations of minor exports through variable 
taxes and perhaps sometimes some small subsidy. On the other hand, the 
tax on the two major export products, coffee and bananas, through the 
official exchange rate is inflexible. Stabilization of prices of these 
products is achieved through additional measures, for example an ad valorem 
export duty of 5 per cent on coffee exports during the boom in 1954« 
Generally, because of the various difficulties and particularly the 
inflationary effect of multiple exchange rate systems, there is a tendency 
in the region to return to single exchange rate systems. The outstanding 
example is Argentina where one free and fluctuating rate was introduced at 
the beginning of 1959» This rate represents a devaluation of the currency 
devised to encourage exports without hampering the maintenance of the 
essential imports» Under the new system, guaranteed minimum prices are 
granted for agricultural products. The margin between ruling international 
prices and these minimum prices is large enough to require export taxes 
in order to prevent inflationary pressure, These taxes are raised in the 
form of foreign exchange retentions varying between 10 and 20 per cent 
for livestock and crop products respectively; for some of the latter an 
additional tax of 15 per cent is levied. When domestic market prices do 
not exceed the minimum prices the National Grain Board purchases any 
quantity offered at the minumum price. In the case of maize support 
purchases were necessary in the past year. Losses arising out of the 
purchases and sales by the National Grain Board are covered by the 
Government out of preestablished allocations, while profits are transferred 
to the following marketing periods. Much of the success of the new system 
which aims at a current adjustment of production to world demand will 
depend on the control of inflation in the country. 
The "aforo" system as applied in Mexico was very successful in 
obtaining its major objectives. There is no way, however, under either 
the "aforo" or the multiple exchange rate system to make sure that the 
modifications in export prices through the policy are reflected in 
producer prices. Sometimes the crop has already been bought by exporters 
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before a tax remission is granted to exports so that producers do not get 
any of the benefits* 
In Venezuela under a revised support system for coffee and cocoa, 
minimum prices are guaranteed to exporters who, in turn, are obliged to 
guarantee minimum prices to producers- This policy is supervised by the 
National Coffee and Cocoa Fund* In Ecuador, the multiple exchange rate 
support system for rice has now been replaced by support purchasing through 
the Provincial Banks who absorb the trading losses; in this way greater 
security is given to rice growers. 
The difficulties of stabilizing prices of export products rise in the 
countries of the region when the terms of trade begin to move against them. 
One major difficulty is that, as a rule, the returns from taxation on 
agricultural exports go into general revenue- Some countries, in other 
regions, however, have adopted an alternative plan of earmarking all, or 
part of the receipts from export levies to augment farmers1 receipts at 
times of depressed prices. This may be done either by direct payments to 
producers, or by using the funds to establish a buffer stock. One advantage 
of this method is that it takes' agricultural price supports out of the field 
of general taxation. But" the very fact that the method involves renouncement 
of government revenue may explain the reason why this method has not so far 
been used in Latin America. In countries with inflationary conditions it 




VII. PRICE SUPPORT AND STABILIZATION POLICIES FOR FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN RELATION TO THE GENERAL ECONOMY 
Agriculture constitutes one of the principal sectors of the Latin 
American economy, since it provides employment for about 50 per cent of the 
economically active population, contributes between 22 and 24 per cent of 
gross national incomes and uses an important share of the area's capital 
and other resources. 
Agriculture also has a principal and dynamic role to play in the present 
stage of economic development of the various countries, since this sector 
must satisfy the growing demand for foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials; 
provide foreign exchange through exports to accelerate economic growth; 
constitute a well remunerated source of employment; be an important consumer 
of agricultural as well as non-agricultural goods and services, and, finally, 
release the labour force required for urban and industrial development. 
The development of the whole economy depends to a large extent on the 
success achieved in meeting these objectives. In many countries there are 
imperfections in the system and these are typical of the region as a whole. 
In fact., insufficient agricultural development is at present causing 
agricultural imports from countries outside the area to increase, especially 
in products such as cereals, dairy products, and vegetable oilseeds, all of 
which can be produced in the region under favourable conditions- Agri-
cultural exports on the other hand, which constitute the main portion of 
or even the total export trade of the majority of countries, have practically 
stagnated at the prewar level, so that a sizeable decline has since taken 
place in the per caput volume« This stagnation is in part due to a general 
world trend affecting several agricultural export products, but may also be 
explained by the decline in Latin America's exportable supplies. Certainly, 
the region's trade balance in these products shows a decline of net exports, 
which in combination with the price falls of recent years causes serious 
pressures on the balance of payments and limits the capacity to import 
capital goods and raw materials-
Although agriculture forms the principal source of employment in the 
region, labour productivity in this activity is very low, due to excessive 
labour supplies, its lack of training, the scarcity of capital per man 
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employed, and the low level of technology. Consequently, rural wages are 
also low-
In the region as a whole, three and one half agricultural workers 
produce the same gross product as one non-agricultural worker. Moreover, 
agricultural productivity is increasing at a much slower pace than would 
be desirable in order to mitigate this great difference, or than would be 
possible if the available technology were used more widely. Added to this 
is the circumstance that rural labour is often paid in kind, and perhaps 
less than half in money. In these conditions the rural worker hardly plays 
a role in the commercial demand for agricultural and non-agricultural goods, 
limiting the scope of industrial development and creating small markets 
which favour the establishment of inefficient and monopolistic industries. 
Far from playing fully its dynamic role in the region's development, 
agriculture therefore tends to act as a break to economic growth, since it 
does not provide the food required by internal demand, forcing countries 
to spend part of their scarce foreign exchange to import consumer goods, 
which with a more efficient production could be substituted by domestic 
production. At the same time imports of capital goods are reduced by the 
unavailability of exportable surpluses of agricultural products and the low 
income levels of the population put a limit on the expansion of the markets 
for industrial goods and for services. 
The Centre paid attention to the possible causes of the situation 
described and agreed that the insufficient agricultural development is to 
be explained by the existence of a series of different factors-. Among these 
were mentioned those connected with economic incentives,.institutional 
causes, structural problems, capital investmentlevels of technology, etc. 
The main economic incentives discussed at the Centre were those 
provided by price support and stabilization policies, subsidies to agri-
cultural requisites, exchange rate differentials and credit and foreign 
trade regulation. 
General agreement existed that these aspects are important but that 
they should be handled in such a way as not to stimulate inefficient 
productive processes or marginal farms• Moreover, incentives should be 
used to stimulate the output of certain products and to discourage that of 
/others, taking 
- 67 -
others, taking due account of the possibilities of complementary develop-
ment of the Latin American regional market. 
The Centre further analyzed other factors contributing to the unbalanced 
growth of agricultural production in relation to demand requirements. Among 
others, the following points were mentioned in this connexion: 
1) The existing size distribution of farms, characterized on the one 
hand by large concentrations of productive but badly used land 
resources in the hands of a few people, and on the other, by the 
existence of a large number of small farmers, which hardly have 
enough land to provide subsistence levels of living. Between 
these two extremes, commercial family farms and a relatively small 
number of -modern and highly efficient enterprises are to be found. 
Both the minifundio and the latifundio typically lack sufficient 
capital investment, and operate inefficiently and at. a low 
technological level. 
2) Inadequate land tenure systems and archaic and unjust methods of 
paying rural labour. In addition to privately or jointly owned 
lands, and the renting of private or public lands, certain other 
tenure types are widely spread over the entire region. These are 
known under a variety of names (the operators are called medieros, 
tanteros, aparceros, inquilinos, huasipungos, colonos, yanaperos, 
etc.) and are used commonly by large land owners as forms of 
payment for labour services. The existence of these mixed land 
tenure types and wage payment systems constitute one of the 
greatest obstacles to agricultural progress. 
3) General consensus was expressed on the fact that the prevalence 
of the above factors was responsible for the low unit-area yields, 
low productivity levels, low income levels of the population and 
the unbalanced distribution of income between labour and entrepreneur. 
4) Many of these structural deficiencies are connected with the 
operation of a tax system that, rather than operating to change 
them; tends to maintain them. The region requires tax policies 
designed to stimulate the efficient utilization of natural 
resources, the use of better techniques, the investment of capital, 
/so as 
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so as to raise the productivity of land and labour. Of equal 
interest are the establishment of progressive taxes or other 
penalties on land that is not utilized productively. 
5) The lack of sufficient transport and storage facilities is 
responsible for the loss of large quantities of farm products in 
the hands of producers, and of great weight losses in cattle which 
are sent to slaughterhouses- Large areas are also kept from being 
cultivated for the same reasons. 
6) Related to the previous point is the problem of processing of 
agricultural products. This industry is only in an early stage 
in Latin America, and its establishment is of great interest since 
it increases the demand for agricultural products, stimulates 
production and facilitates their conservation, transport and 
distribution. In Venezuela, with the assistance of the Development 
Corporation, a credit programme is being established for the 
development of agriculture. With a view to achieving a balanced 
and efficient programme, a study of priorities for the various 
production sectors is being carried out- In addition, a special 
department for the processing industries was-created in order to 
study the technical and economic aspects of the concession of 
• credits and of. the promotion of agricultural industries to be 
newly established in the country- A special section will supervise 
the investment of the credits and will grant technical assistance 
to the existing or newly established agricultural enterprises. 
7) The low level of education which prevails in a large sector of 
the population is another obstacle to agricultural development, 
since the manual worker lacks the ability to perform specialized 
operations. The land tenure and remuneration systems mentioned 
above do not provide him with sufficient incentive to acquire 
this ability. To this is added the low level of technical knowledge 
of many farm entrepreneurs-
8) The low level of agricultural technology in Latin America was also 
discussed and it was agreed that this contributes to the low and 
declining level of .agricultural yields- It was noted .that the 
/existing experimental 
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existing experimental and extension services are too small, and 
that there is much duplication of effort and dispersion of 
resources in this field. Furthermore, excessive emphasis is 
given in many countries to the aspect of mechanization, without 
considering first where to employ the labour that is being 
displaced by the greater use of machinery. 
9) The low level of agricultural investment which largely derives 
from past inadequate price policies may be considered both the 
cause and the result of the low unit area yields and labour 
productivity- The improvement of technology in rural areas 
requires increased investments, some of which should be made by 
private individuals, while others are to be made by the public 
sector. In general terms it may be stated that this aspect is 
neglected considerably in the region. 
10) Finally, it was considered that many of the existing agricultural 
problems could be solved more easily through the establishment of 
farmers1 associations at all levels and in all activities. 
In the view of the Centre a fully effective agricultural development 
policy would have to take into consideration all the factors discussed 
above. The present report is concerned explicitly with the economic 
incentives for an expansion of production, and it has been shown that in 
the past these were generally insufficient to foster a level of investment 
and consequently a rate of increase in the agricultural productivity and 
production necessary for the balanced economic development of the region. 
These policies are now being modified and a considerable improvement may 
be expected to ensue. Nevertheless, higher prices knd other incentives to 
increased agricultural production cannot be expected to exert their full 
potential effects unless parallel improvements are made to remove the other 
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE MEETINGS OF THE CENTRE 
1. Opening address by Mr. Mario Astorga Cartes, Director General of 
Agriculture. 
2. Message from Mr. B. R. Sen, Director General of the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations, read at the Opening 
Ceremony by D. Hernán Santa Cruz, Regional FAO Representative for 
latin America. 
3. Statement by the Delegate of Argentina. 
4« Statement by the Delegation of Colombia on the Provisional Agenda 
of the Latin American Centre on Agricultural and Food Price Support 
and Stabilization Policies. 
5. The importance of Agriculture for General Economic Development in 
Colombia. 
6. Official Price Policies for Agricultural Products in Chile. 
7. Statement by the Delegate of Ecuador. 
8. Statement of Price Stabilization in Guatemala. 
9« General Objectives and Methods of Implementation of the Price 
Stabilization and Support Policy for Agricultural and Food 
Products in the Republic of Panama through the Institute of 
Economic Development. 
1®. The Tobacco Stabilization Fund - Cuba. 
11. Statement by the Delegation of Venezuela. 





Opening ceremony. . 
2. Election of Chairman anil Vice-Chairman. 
3. Adoption of agenda and procedures. 
4« General objectives and methods of implementing food and agricultural 
price stabilization and support policies in latin American countries. 
Introductory statements by participants on the main objectives, the 
scope and commodity coverage, and the methods used in implementing 
current price stabilization and support policies, as applied to: 
(a) agricultural producers 
(b) consumers 
(c) the export trade in agricultural products. . 
5. Special features of the countries of the .r&gion- which influence the 
objectives and the choice of methods of carrying out their food and 
agricultural price and support policies. 
A brief discussion to establish some of the main economic and social 
factors which determine the food arid agricultural policies of Latin 
American countries, e.g. 
Unusually rapid growth of population and demand; 
Consequent tendency to inflationary pressures, in the absence of 
adequate resources for food imports; 
Low consumer incomes and consumption levels; 
Limited government revenues; 
Relatively under-developed machinery of administration in most 
countries; 
Under-development of industrial and other non-agricultural 
sectors of the economy; 
Competition of non-agricultural industries with agriculture for 
investment funds and labour; 
Heavy dependence on agricultural exports for earnings of foreign 
exchange. 
6. Policies affecting prices and incomes of agricultural producers. 
(i) What are the main objectives sought? To expand agricultural 
output? To stabilize food prices? To reduce food imports? 
To encourage exports? To support or raise the incomes of 
farmers generally, or of particular groups of farmers? To 
encourage agricultural productivity and competitive power? 
To increase government revenues? Other objectives? Or 
several of these in combination? 
(ii) What 
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(ii) What prices regulation or support measures are used to attain 
these objectives? 
(iii) What measures other than the regulation of prices are em-
ployed, e.g. special credit facilities to farmers, measures 
to reduce the cost of farm machinery or other requisites, 
other measures to increase productivity or to reduce 
distribution costs? 
6.A. [Implementation of producer price policies. 
(i). How is. the level of official producer prices fixed? By 
What methods are the official prices of the various 
commodities brought into proper relation? What are the 
main economic indicators or other factors to be taken 
into account? 
(ii) Would there be any advantage in adopting price fixing 
formulae of the kind used in the United States and some 
other countries (e.g. parity or cost of production formulae)? 
What difficulties might arise? 
(iii) Are official prices fixed, minimum or ceiling prices? 
How have they compared with world market prices? What 
has been the trend of official producer prices in recent 
years compared with"(a) prices of farm requisites, 
(b) general price trends? 
(iv) How are official producer price levels enforced? By 
government purchases? By regulating imports and exports? 
By regulating production? By buffer stocks? What are the 
main advantages and disadvantages of these various methods 
of price stabilization tinder Latin American conditions? 
(v) Are there any examples in the region of stabilization 
funds or other devices for reducing fluctuations in farm 
incomes without necessarily regulating market prices? 
How far might they be suitable to the conditions of the 
countries of the region? 
6.B. Measures to reduce costs and to raise productivity. 
(i) What are the principal measures used in the region to 
reduce agricultural production costs and to raise 
productivity? How successful have they proved? Are there 
ways in which their effectiveness could be increased? 
Should they be more widely used? 
(ii) How far could measures to reduce the cost ahd to increase 
the efficiency of marketing and distribution help to 
reconcile the twin objectives of providing greater incentives 
to expand production and of keeping down the cost of food 
to consumers? How far has the lack of marketing facilities 
tended to hamper agricultural expansion? 
/6.C. Appraisal 
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6.C. Appraisal of Producer price and support policies. 
(i) How far have producer price policies proved successful 
in achieving their main objectives? E.g. e^anding 
output to meet the growing demand? In stabilizing farm 
prices and incomes? In contributing to general price 
stabilization? Etc. etc. 
(ii) How far have producer price policies been successful in 
maintaining an appropriate balance in the output of the 
different agricultural commodities? 
(iii) Are there any indications that the effectiveness of 
producer price policies (including incentive price for an 
expansion of production) has sometimes been reduced by the 
agrarian structure or other institutional factors? 
(iv) How, in Latin American conditions, can the limited funds 
available be best apportioned between'(a) direct producer 
price supports, and (b) measures aimed directly at 
increasing farm incomes by greater productivity, or by 
reducing the cost of production and marketing? 
(v) Do taxation, revenue or import policies at times tend to 
reduce agricultural productivity^ e.g. by restricting farm 
credit, or by making farm requisites scarce or expensive? 
How could any adverse effects be avoided? 
7. Food price policies. 
(i) What are the main objectives of food price policies? To 
stabilize the prices of staple foods? To check inflationary 
pressures? To reduce distribution margins? To raise food 
consumption levels generally or for particular sections of 
the population? Etc. etc. What measures are employed? 
What relative importance- is attached to price ceilings, to 
regulating market supplies, to consumer subsidies? 
(ii) Should price ceilings be imposed at the wholesale or retail 
levels or' both? What is the general experience of enforcing 
such ceilings (a) with no regulation of market supplies, 
(b) with the aid of some regulation of supplies? 
(iii) What are the main problems of regulating market supplies? 
How may this be most effectively done? E.g. by regulating 
exports and imports? By competitive buying and selling 
through official agencies? By other methods including 
rationing? 
(iv) What are the advantages and disadvantages of the subsidies 
which have been used in the region to reduce retail food 
prices generally, or for particular groups of consumers? 




(vi) How far do retail or wholesale price ceilings influence 
farm prices and farm production? How can any adverse 
influences be minimized? 
8, Price policies for agricultural exports. 
(i) What are the main objectives of current policies? To 
maximize government revenues? To maximize earnings of 
foreign exchange? To. diversify exports? To increase the 
competitive power of export products on world, markets? 
Etc. etc. 
(ii) What are the main advantages and the main disadvantages or 
difficulties of operating the principal methods used in 
the region? 
(a) Regulation of the volume of exports. 
(b): State export agencies. 
(c) Multiple and variable exchange rates. 
(d) The aforo system. 
(iii) Would.stabilization funds of the kind used in Australia 
or New Zeland or other similar devices be likely to be 
of value in latin American conditions? Could they be 
usefully combined with any of the measures, listed 
under (ii)? 
9. Food and agricultural price stabilization and support policies in 
relation to the economy as a whole. 
(i) What measures have proved necessary in the experience of 
the countries of the region to coordinate price stabiliza-
tion and support policies for agricultural producers, for 
consumers, and for the export trade in the interests of 
the whole economy, and to prévent the various measures 
cancelling each other out? 
(ii) What have been the main sources of operating funds of 
food and agricultural price stabilization and support 
measures? 
(iii) How has the final incidence of the burden of such schemes 
fallen as between agricultural producers, domestic consumers 
and foreign buyers? Has there been, in general, a transfer 
of funds to agriculture or from agriculture under the 
various schemes? 
(iv) What in the experience of the countries of the region has 
been the main influence of the various measures on: 
(a) Production efficiency in agriculture; 
(b) Farm incomes; 




(v) What in the experience of the countries of the region has 
been the main influence of the various measures on: 
(a) General price levels and costs; 
(b) The level of international trade; 
(c) The steady progress of economic development? 
10• Conclusions. 
What in the light of the foregoing discussions have been the main 
strengths and the main weaknesses of latin American policies and 
measures in this field? What practical steps might be taken to 
increase their effectiveness? 

